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PREFACE 
 
 
Food expenditures away from home have steadily increased over the past thirty years. In 1980, 
32% of food expenditure dollars were spent away from home, but by 2010, this share of food 
expenditures had grown to almost 44% (ERS, 2011). Further, Todd, Mancino, and Lin (2010) 
estimated that for each additional meal eaten away from home, consumers ate an additional 134 
calories. By their estimation, the average person will gain two pounds each year just by eating 
out one meal a week! 
 The combined increases in eating away from home and U.S. obesity/overweight rates 
have caught the attention of policymakers. In an effort to help promote healthier food choices, a 
mandatory menu labeling law was passed in the 2010 health care bill. Though the official 
guidelines have not been set, it is proposed that chain restaurants (those restaurants with 20 or 
more outlets) will be required to provide: (1) calorie information for all menu items on all menu 
forms (including drive-throughs), (2) full nutrition profiles for all menu items available on site, 
and (3) a statement of the daily recommended caloric intake for the average person (FDA, 2011). 
 With the passage of this menu labeling legislation, research regarding the potential (and 
actual) effectiveness of mandatory calorie labels has grown rapidly. Despite the expanding 
literature, there are still many gaps which need to be addressed. The purpose of this research is to 
answer many of the questions about menu labeling which still remain using data from two field 
experiments in full service restaurants. 
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 In Chapter 1, I estimate a structural model of consumer demand to determine the 
economic value of information for restaurant menu labels. Two types of calorie labels are 
examined: (1) a traditional numeric calorie label where only the number of calories are listed by 
each menu item and (2) a symbolic calorie label where we provide a traffic light symbol (which 
indicates specific calorie ranges) in addition to the number of calories for each menu item. The 
experimental design allows one to compare the effectiveness of calorie labels to a “fat tax” or 
“thin subsidy” at reducing caloric intake. Results show numeric labels did not influence demand, 
but symbolic traffic light labels reduced the marginal utility of caloric intake. Our model projects 
both labels would reduce intake more than high-calorie taxes or low-calorie subsidies. 
Ultimately, traffic light calorie labels led to the largest reduction in caloric intake but also one of 
the largest reductions in restaurant net returns. 
 One potential concern in Chapter 1 is that the experiment was designed in a way where 
all menu labeling treatments were examined simultaneously, which could cause the effect of the 
calorie labels to diminish over time. Thus, in the second restaurant, we designed the experiment 
so that there were distinct pre- and post-labeling periods. Chapter 2 offers a comparison of the 
two restaurants.  Ultimately, both field experiments lead us to the same conclusion: the numeric 
calorie label (as currently proposed by the FDA) had little effect on total caloric intake. Our 
results do reveal, however, that the effectiveness of the numeric label could be enhanced with the 
addition of a traffic light symbol identifying low-, medium-, and high-calorie items. 
 A key issue in the labeling literature is the fact that there is still no consensus on whether 
or not calorie labels are effective at reducing caloric intake. This suggests the possibility of 
heterogeneity in responses to caloric labels across people with different attitudes and 
demographics. In Chapter 3, I explore the potential relationships between caloric intake and 
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diners’ socio-economic characteristics and attitudes. Results show that calorie labels have the 
greatest impact on those who are least health conscious. Additionally, calorie labels are more 
likely to influence the selection of the main entrée as opposed to supplemental items such as 
drinks and desserts. Finally, irrespective of the menu treatment to which a subject was assigned, 
this study identifies which types of people are likely to be low-, medium-, and high-calorie 
diners. 
 Lastly, in Chapter 4, I discuss the main findings of these studies and the potential 
implications of calorie labels for both consumers and restaurants. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
THE VALUE AND COST OF RESTAURANT CALORIE LABELS: 
RESULTS FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT 
 
In 2009, Americans spent 42% of their food dollars on meals away from home (Morrison, 
Mancino, and Variyam, 2011). Consumers choose to eat outside the home for a variety of 
reasons including convenience, but there is mounting concern that this spending pattern will have 
a detrimental effect on Americans’ diet and overall health. Todd, Mancino, and Lin (2010) 
estimated that for each additional meal eaten away from home, consumers ate an additional 134 
calories. By their estimation, the average person will gain two pounds each year just by eating 
out one meal a week. Not only does food away from home tend to be higher in calories, its 
nutrient quality pales in comparison to meals prepared in the home (Todd, Mancino, and Lin, 
2010). 
 The combined increases in eating away from home and U.S. obesity/overweight rates 
have caught the attention of policymakers. In an effort to help promote healthier food choices, 
several cities, counties, and states have passed or are considering legislation which would require 
nutrition labeling on restaurant menus (CSPI, 2010). With the passage of the 2010 health care 
bill, a standardized menu labeling system will soon be required in restaurants across the country.
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The labeling guidelines currently being set by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will 
take precedence over local labeling laws. Although the specific guidelines have not been released 
(they are expected to be released by the end of 2011), it is probable that restaurants with 20 or 
more outlets will be required to provide: (1) calorie information for all menu items on all menus, 
menu boards, food tags, and drive-throughs, (2) additional nutrition information for all menu 
items available upon request, and (3) a statement of the recommended daily caloric intake (2,000 
calories/day) for the average individual (FDA, 2011). 
 While the literature on menu labeling in restaurants is expanding, large gaps in 
knowledge remain. This research was designed to fill many of these gaps by explicitly 
calculating the value of information present in two types of calorie labels using data collected 
from a field experiment in which restaurant diners were unaware of the ongoing study.  The 
innovativeness of our approach can be seen by briefly surveying the existing literature on the 
topic. 
Past research on the effectiveness of menu labeling has been remarkably inconclusive. 
Some studies conclude providing nutritional information on menus lowers caloric intake (e.g., 
Milich, Anderson, and Mills, 1976; Wisdom, Downs, and Loewenstein, 2010). Yet, other studies 
find the information has no effect (e.g., Mayer et al., 1987; Harnack et al., 2008). Even among 
studies finding an effect, the size of the effect tends to be small. For example, Balfour et al. 
(1996) and Yamamoto et al. (2005) found that only a small proportion of consumers (16% and 
29%, respectively) changed their menu item selection when presented with nutrition information. 
Importantly, none of these previous studies have provided an estimate of the economic value of 
nutritional information on restaurant menus that could be used in a cost-benefit analysis.  
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 One of the primary weaknesses of previous research relates to issues concerning external 
validity.  In particular, many of the previous studies have been conducted in artificial settings in 
which participants were aware of the on-going research. The earliest studies on restaurant menu 
labeling were not actually conducted in restaurants but in laboratory or cafeteria settings (Milich, 
Anderson, and Mills, 1976; Cinciripini, 1984; Mayer et al., 1987; Balfour et al., 1996; 
Yamamoto et al., 2005; Harnack et al., 2008). There is ample evidence that people often behave 
differently when they are aware that their behavior is scrutinized, suggesting the need for 
research in a more natural setting (Harrison and List, 2004; Levitt and List, 2007).  More recent 
studies have been conducted in fast-food restaurants (Chandon and Wansink, 2007; Wisdom, 
Downs, and Loewenstein, 2010), but to our knowledge only one study has been conducted in a 
full service, sit-down restaurant (Pulos and Leng, 2010). This setting is of particular interest 
because diners actually have time to thoughtfully consider nutrition information presented on 
menus, which is often not the case in fast-food outlets.  Moreover, the sample of consumers self-
selecting into fast-food restaurants is likely to respond differently to menu labels than consumers 
selecting full service restaurants.     
 Another weakness of previous research relates to the type of nutritional information 
provided. Past research has solely focused on providing calorie information in a numeric format 
(i.e., the number of calories beside each menu item). Although this is a straightforward way to 
present information to diners, research has shown people are unfamiliar with calories, often 
grossly mis-estimate caloric intake, and are unaware of how many calories they should consume 
on a daily basis (Burton et al., 2006; Krukowski et al., 2006; Blumenthal and Volpp, 2010). 
Given these difficulties, one might question whether numeric calorie labeling will substantively 
influence consumer choice.  As the research in behavioral economics shows, how information is 
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provided can be just as (if not more) important as which information is provided (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008). Based on the information processing literature (Scammon, 1977; Russo et al., 
1986), we hypothesize that symbolic presentation of nutrition information will have a larger 
effect than numeric calorie information. Symbols are easier to process for the consumer, and 
serve as a quick guide or normative suggestion to choose lower-calorie menu items. 
 Federal legislative efforts have primarily focused on food information policies, but these 
are not the only policy instruments which could be used to encourage healthier eating. Indeed, 
many have argued for pricing policies such as “fat taxes” and “thin subsidies” to direct 
consumers toward lower-calorie items. French (2003) found that imposing a “thin subsidy” for 
low-fat items in vending machines (50% price reduction) can dramatically increase sales on 
those items (93% increase); nevertheless, price changes of this magnitude are politically 
infeasible.  Most studies on “fat taxes” have concluded they will have very little effect on caloric 
intake (e.g., see Kuchler, Tegene, and Harris, 2005; Dharmasena and Capps, 2011; Schroeter, 
Lusk, and Tyner, 2008) or obesity rates as these taxes will likely cause consumers to change 
where they eat rather than how much they eat (Anderson and Matsa, 2011). Regrettably, few 
studies have attempted to compare the relative effectiveness of different policy options (i.e., 
information or labeling policies versus pricing policies) under an over-arching experimental 
design. One exception is the study by Horgen and Brownell (2002) who studied labeling and 
pricing interventions in a restaurant setting.  However, in their study, labels were not provided 
for all menu items and advertising was used to draw diners’ attention to the healthier and lower-
priced items. Our research aims to compare policy options in a natural environment more similar 
to the world in which the policies would be implemented. 
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 Finally, previous research has failed to determine how menu labeling will affect parties 
other than the consumer. Although there are costs associated with item reformulation and menu 
redesigns, there has been little accounting of how consumers’ new choices might affect 
restaurant profitability. In fact, only one study to our knowledge considers the effect of calorie 
labels on restaurant revenue (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen, 2011). Thorough economic 
analysis, however, should compare the benefit of providing caloric information to diners (via 
diners’ value of information) to the cost of information provision (change in restaurant net 
returns over food and preparation costs due to menu label). Additionally, accounting for changes 
in net returns (over food and preparation costs) is needed to quantify the trade-offs for each 
policy option (e.g., Policy A will decrease caloric intake by X calories but will reduce restaurant 
net returns by Z dollars). Our study is designed to provide information on such tradeoffs. 
The overall purpose of this research is to perform an in-depth examination of menu 
labeling and pricing policies in a full service, sit-down restaurant. Specifically, this research 
determines: (1) whether caloric labels in a full service restaurant influence food choice, (2) 
whether symbolic calorie labels are more/less influential than numeric calorie labels, (3) how 
effective menu labels are relative to “fat taxes” and “thin subsidies” at reducing caloric intake, 
(4) how menu labeling and “fat taxes/thin subsidies” affect restaurant net returns (over food and 
preparation costs), and (5) the economic value of menu labels. 
 
II. Data and Experimental Design 
From August to November 2010, daily lunch receipts were collected from The Rancher’s Club, a 
full service, sit-down restaurant in Stillwater, Oklahoma. The Rancher’s Club is upscale relative 
to other restaurants in town, with diners in our sample spending more than $14 on average for 
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lunch including drinks and deserts.  The restaurant is located on the Oklahoma State University 
campus but is open to (and frequented by) residents without affiliation with the University.  
Importantly, the restaurant had never previously been used for research purposes, making it 
unlikely diners would have any expectation of being part of a research study. 
The restaurant was divided into three sections, each of which was assigned to a particular 
menu treatment.  The authors informed restaurant staff of the general purpose of the study and 
stressed the need to maintain consistency over the course of the experiment (i.e., ensure diners 
were presented with the correct menu). Hosts and servers were also trained on how to address 
diners’ questions on the new menus, with an emphasis on factually answering the question rather 
than offering opinions on diet and nutrition. Restaurant patrons were unaware of the ongoing 
study, and in an effort to minimize response bias, wait staff were instructed to refrain from 
telling diners about the study. 
The restaurant offered a total of 51 menu options, including items such as soups and 
salads, burgers, pasta, and even prime steaks.  This menu offering allowed for a wide range of 
caloric values and prices ranging from a low of $3 for a cup of soup to a high of $58 for the 
prime steak. Caloric contents were obtained for each item using The Food Processor nutrition 
analysis software.
1
 The head chef entered recipes for each menu item to obtain the most accurate 
calorie counts. Although complete nutrition profiles were available for each item, we only 
provided calorie information on menus in an effort to mirror what is likely to be mandated by the 
FDA.  
Upon entering the restaurant, a lunch-party was randomly assigned to one of three menu 
treatments.  All menu versions included descriptions and prices of each menu item, but the level 
of caloric information provided varied. The control used the restaurant’s conventional menu that 
                                                          
1
More information on the software is available at http://www.esha.com/foodprosql 
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was in existence prior to the experiment. The control menu did not provide any information on 
an item’s caloric content. The menu contained a brief description of each item and had the item’s 
price. In the first manipulation, which we call the calorie only menu treatment, diners were given 
menus that had caloric information in parentheses immediately preceding each item’s price. 
Other than this change, the menu was exactly the same as the control menu. In the second 
manipulation, which we refer to as the symbolic or calorie+traffic light menu treatment, diners 
were given menus with caloric information in parentheses immediately preceding each item’s 
price plus a “traffic light” symbol that was red for items with more than 800 calories, yellow for 
items between 401 and 800 calories, and green for items with 400 calories or less. Caloric 
category cutoff points were selected so that each color was well represented on the menu. Aside 
from the addition of the traffic light symbols, the menu was identical to the one used in the 
calorie only treatment.  
 To be clear, all diners at a table received the same menu. However, each table was 
assigned to a menu treatment, and parties were randomly assigned to a table upon entering the 
restaurant.  Thus, at any given time all three menus were in use in the restaurant. The strength of 
this experimental design strategy is that differences in ordering patterns across menu treatments 
cannot be attributed to changes in menu preferences over time (such as changes across seasons 
from Summer to Winter or from changes from Monday to Friday). A potential weakness of the 
design is that repeat customers to the restaurant may be assigned to a different menu treatment on 
a subsequent visit. A diner previously assigned to the traffic light menu may remember the 
information and utilize it if later assigned to the control menu. Such an effect would cause 
differences across treatments to diminish over time. This is an issue we control for in the data 
analysis.     
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The experiment ran a total of 19 weeks. After the 12th week, we manipulated the prices 
of selected menu items on all three menus. Items were selected based on how frequently they 
were ordered; those which were ordered most regularly were ideal candidates for the price 
manipulation. Table 1.1 outlines the specific menu items chosen for the price manipulation, their 
caloric contents, and the magnitude of their price changes. As shown in table 1.1, we see a “fat 
tax” was imposed on four high-calorie (red light) menu items, while a “thin subsidy” was 
imposed on three lower-calorie (green or yellow light) menu items. Most price changes ranged 
from 10-13% of the item’s initial price; a constant percentage increase/decrease was not utilized 
in an effort to maintain the restaurant’s pricing format (whole or half dollar pricing). Two high-
calorie items (the West Coast Cheese Burger and the Cowboy Combo), however, were assigned 
much larger price changes (17% and 23% price increases, respectively) relative to the other 
options. These items were especially high in calories; thus, they were taxed more heavily.  
The purpose of the price manipulation was twofold.  First, we wanted to directly compare 
how caloric intake changed as a result of menu labels as compared to a calorie tax/subsidy. 
Secondly, in the structural demand model described in the next section, we wanted to ensure that 
the marginal utility of price could be clearly identified and as we describe momentarily, the price 
manipulation helps ensure the price effect is not confounded with unobserved quality effects.  
 
IV. Model and Data Analysis 
Our analysis is based on a random utility model constructed to explain the choice of main entrée.  
Diner i’s utility from menu option j at time t is assumed to depend on the attributes of the menu 
choice option (e.g., price, caloric content) and a stochastic error term representing individual 
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idiosyncrasies unobservable to the analyst.  For an individual randomly assigned to menu type m 
(m = no label, calorie only label, calorie+traffic light label), the random utility function is: 
(1)     
      
      
  
For the basic model we consider, the systematic portion of the utility function is: 
(2)     
              
        
          
           
          
         
              
           
               
             , 
where          is the price of menu item j faced by individual i at time t,      is the number of 
calories in menu item j, and the remaining variables are self-explanatory dummy variables 
describing j’s food type.  The food-type dummy variables coincide with the major section 
headings on the menu.  The marginal (dis)utility of price,  , does not have a menu superscript, 
m.  This is an economic restriction we impose on the analysis which permits the calculation of 
welfare effects resulting from changes in menu label format.  Without this restriction, one cannot 
calculate the monetary tradeoff needed to equate utility in two different menu treatments. 
 Equation (2) posits that consumers’ utility for a menu item is affected by the item’s 
calories. Colby, Elder, and Peterson (1987) found that consumers overwhelmingly consider a 
menu item’s taste to be its most important attribute.  Additionally, Horgen and Brownell (2002) 
suggest consumers may believe “healthy” menu items sacrifice taste, and thus, may choose less 
“healthy” options. For these reasons, we hypothesize that without any nutritional information, 
utility will be increasing with calories (i.e.,   
         ).   
When calorie information is present, the marginal utility of calories may change.  
Numerous studies in the nutrition literature have shown people tend to underestimate the number 
of calories in the foods they consume (see Burton et al., 2006; Chandon and Wansink, 2007), so 
when consumers learn (via nutritional information) they are eating more calories than they 
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believed, feelings of guilt or disappointment may arise from overeating, and their utility from 
that food choice may fall. Alternatively, the provision of nutrition information may reduce the 
bias in estimates of caloric intake, so simply being more aware of the nutritional content of one’s 
food could also decrease utility. Whatever the reason, we expect the marginal utility of caloric 
intake will fall in the calorie only and calorie+traffic light treatments relative to the control.  
If the error terms in equation (1) are distributed iid type I extreme value, McFadden 
(1974) shows that out of a set of J alternatives, the probability of alternative j being chosen is the 
familiar multinomial logit model:  
(3)      
       (                  )  
 
    
 
∑      
  
   
 
 Despite allowing all the non-price parameters to vary by menu treatment, equation (2) is 
a rather simplistic utility specification.  Several alternative specifications were considered but 
none proved to significantly improve model fit.  For example, because the experiment ran 19 
weeks, it is possible that some diners were returning guests who might have become desensitized 
to the new menu labels.  If this were the case, one would expect the effect of menu labeling to 
dissipate over time.  However, when equation (2) is modified to include a time trend variable 
interacted with the attributes, none of the time-attribute interactions were statistically significant, 
and as a result we omitted them from the model.   
Another potentially restrictive assumption of the multinomial logit is that the error term, 
    
 , is assumed independently and identically distributed across individuals and alternatives.  
However, some menu alternatives (or people) might share unobserved similarities which cause 
their errors to be correlated.  To address this issue, we estimated error-component models.  In 
this model, alternative-specific random effects were added in which it was assumed that items in 
the same sub-section of the menu shared a common error component.  In such specifications, 
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however, the estimated standard deviation of the random effects were not statistically different 
from zero, and this was true for specifications in which we assumed a menu-day random effect, 
day-only random effect, or no panel structure at all.  A similarly motivated nested-logit 
specification, which assumes menu items within a nest (but not across nests) exhibit similar 
substitution patterns, did not significantly improve model fit either.  As a result, the ultimate 
analysis rests on the conventional multinomial logit specification.  We also tested for differences 
in error variance across menu treatments following Swait and Louviere (1993), but found no 
evidence of heteroskedasticity.  Finally, likelihood ratio tests could not reject the null hypothesis 
that   
           
               
             
 for all k > 1, meaning that the calorie labels only 
influenced the marginal utility of calories but not the marginal utilities associated with food-type.   
One final model specification issue which had a substantive impact on results relates to 
the potential for unobserved, alternative-specific quality attributes to correlate with the 
alternative’s price leading to a biased estimate   (see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995 and 
Nevo, 2001).  Petrin and Train (2010) suggested a relatively straightforward method to account 
for this type of endogeneity problem assuming one is in possession of a good instrument for 
price.  A good instrument should be highly correlated with price but uncorrelated with the 
unobserved quality of the menu item.  Fortunately, our experimental design was constructed to 
yield precisely such an instrument.   
Let d1j be a dummy variable indicating items for which we increased prices (and d2j those 
for which we decreased prices) after the experimental price manipulation, and let t be a dummy 
variable indicating those observations obtained after the experimental price manipulation.  The 
interaction between these variables, d1j*t and d2j*t, are valid instruments for Priceitj because they 
are clearly correlated with price but, by construction, they are not characteristics of the choice 
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alternatives.  The choice alternatives did not change over time, and so assuming that the marginal 
utilities of product characteristics (both observed and unobserved) do not change over time, the 
instrument is orthogonal to the error term. 
Following Petrin and Train (2010), we regressed Priceitj against the two instruments, 
d1j*t, d2j*t, the dummy variables d1j and d2j, and all the non-price attributes in equation (2).  
Letting eitj be the error term from this regression, Petrin and Train (2010) show that an unbiased 
estimate of the price effect can be obtained by replacing equation (2) with: 
(4)  ̃   
   ̃          ̃ 
       ̃         ̃          ̃         ̃         
             ̃          ̃              ̃                     
This so-called control function approach produces unbiased estimates, but the conventional 
standard errors are incorrect.  As a result, we used bootstrapping to obtain the standard errors.   
 Once the parameter estimates are obtained, expected caloric intake and restaurant net 
returns over food and preparation costs for menu type m can be calculated as:  
(5)  [        ]  ∑  ̃ 
  
        
and 
(6)   [           ]  ∑  ̃ 
  
          , 
where  ̃ 
  is the probability of choosing menu item j given menu type m, which is obtained by 
substituting the utility specification in equation (4) into equation (3).        represents the 
mark-up, or margin, for each menu item j, which provides the net returns for each menu item 
above its food and preparation costs. Mark-up values were provided by the restaurant’s 
management team. In addition to studying the calorie and net return impacts of different menus, 
the effects of a “fat tax” or “thin subsidy” on caloric intake and net returns can also be simulated 
by changing the prices of certain menu items and re-calculating (5) and (6) at the altered 
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probabilities of choice.  For this application, we considered a “fat tax” in which the prices of all 
items more than 800 calories (i.e., the “red” items on the traffic light menu) were increased 10%, 
and also a “thin subsidy” in which the prices of all items less than 400 calories (i.e., the “green” 
items on the traffic light menu) were decreased 10%. 
 In addition to these calorie and net return changes, it is also useful to consider 
individuals’ willingness-to-pay for different menu items.  The utility coefficients given in 
equation (4) can readily be used in this regard.  For example, an individual’s willingness-to-pay 
for a prime steak instead of a salad is just the price difference between the two options that 
would generate the same level of utility: [( ̃   ̃ 
               )  ( ̃   ̃ 
         )]   .   
A calculation more relevant to the policy debate, however, is the value of information or 
the welfare change resulting from a move from the conventional menus to the menus containing 
caloric information.  One challenge with such a calculation is that the mandatory labeling policy 
does not actually change the underlying quality of the product.  The labels simply serve to 
provide information to diners about the choices they actually face.  Foster and Just (1998) 
introduced a method to measure welfare changes in situations such as this; an approach that was 
extended to random utility models by Leggett (2002).     
In this framework, consumers are assumed to make choices based on their (potentially 
incorrect) perceptions of quality, but the utility they ultimately experience is determined by 
actual quality.  Foster and Just (1998) argue that a “cost of ignorance” can be determined by 
calculating the welfare loss that would result if consumers gained new information (making 
perceived quality equal actual quality) but were constrained to make the same choices as they did 
before information.  The value of information is negative one times the cost of ignorance.    
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In the discrete choice framework, Leggett (2002) showed that the appropriate welfare 
measure in this framework is:  
(7) [
  (∑  
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The first term in brackets is the conventional welfare calculation except that the utility in the no 
label world,  ̃  
        , is based on consumers’ perceptions of caloric intake.  This is the value 
Leggett (2002) refers to as the anticipated utility change.  In our case, this change might very 
well be negative if consumers tend to under-estimate the number of calories consumed prior to 
labels (Chandon and Wansink, 2007).  This anticipated change, however, is based on incorrect 
perceptions of quality in the pre-label environment.  The second term in brackets captures the 
value of the adjustment in perceptions as they approach true quality in the post-label 
environment.  It captures the cost of ignorance resulting from diners making a different set of 
choices than they would have with better information.  The standard errors associated with the 
welfare effects of the label change are determined using the aforementioned bootstrapped utility 
parameters. 
 
V. Results 
Daily lunch receipts collected over a 19-week period yielded 1,532 usable observations. The 
focal unit of analysis for each observation was the main entrée choice. Recall restaurant patrons 
received one of three menus upon being seated: a menu with no nutritional information, a menu 
with calorie information only (numeric calorie label) for each item, or a menu with calorie 
information plus a traffic light symbol (symbolic calorie label) for each item. 
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 Using the raw data, we compared how frequently each item was ordered under each 
menu treatment to determine whether calorie labels influence food choice. For illustrative 
purposes, figure 1.1 shows how often three menu items were ordered.  The three items were 
chosen to represent a low, medium, or high-calorie menu option. Per the figure, we see that the 
Signature Cheese Burger (a high-calorie, red light, item) made up the greatest proportion of 
meals ordered, 5.1%, under the control menu where no calorie label was provided. Conversely, 
this item only composed 3.6% of total items ordered when diners had the symbolic calorie 
(calorie+traffic light) menu. The six ounce sirloin (a low-calorie, green light item), on the other 
hand, was especially popular in the symbolic calorie label treatment, comprising 5.3% of total 
meals ordered. In the case of the West Coast Rancher (a medium-calorie, yellow light item), it 
was frequently ordered in all three menu treatments, but accounted for the largest share of total 
meals ordered (10.2%) when the numeric calorie label was present.  
 Looking at the order frequency of individual menu items across treatments offers some 
insight on whether calorie labels influence food choice. However, with 51 menu items to choose 
from, we recognize some items will be ordered far more often than others, and some items may 
not be ordered at all (i.e., a $50 steak). Thus, figure 1.2 reports how frequently low, medium, and 
high-calorie items were ordered across menu treatments. From figure 1.2, it can be seen that low-
calorie items, those with 400 calories or less, were ordered most often in the symbolic calorie 
label treatment (38.8% of all meals ordered) and least often in the no calorie label treatment 
(29.9% of all meals ordered). High-calorie items, those with more than 800 calories, were just 
the opposite. These items were selected most when no calorie label was present and least when 
the symbolic calorie label was present, representing 34.5% and 28.1% of all meals ordered, 
respectively. Medium-calorie items, those with 401-800 calories, were chosen at least one-third 
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of the time in each of the menu treatments, and were most popular in the numeric calorie label 
treatment, accounting for 38.4% of all meals ordered. From figure 1.2, we can conclude that 
calorie labels resulted in significantly more low and medium-calorie items ordered compared to 
high-calorie items (p-value=0.01). The presence of either a numeric or symbolic calorie label 
reduced the proportion of high-calorie items chosen by 4.4% or 6.4%, respectively. 
 
Structural Demand Estimates 
While many previous studies have solely focused on analyzing the number of calories 
ordered/consumed, we estimated a structural demand model which allows us to estimate the 
welfare effects resulting from menu labeling changes and to simulate outcomes in alternative 
policy scenarios. Table 1.2 presents two sets of multinomial logit (MNL) estimates: the 
conventional model and the model corrected using the control function approach (Petrin and 
Train 2010) to resolve the potential price endogeneity issues. 
 The most notable difference between the two sets of estimates is the magnitude of the 
price coefficient. Under the conventional model, a one dollar increase in an item’s price is 
projected to decrease utility by 0.0285 units; however, in the corrected model, a one dollar price 
increase results in a 0.1286 unit decrease in utility. Further, the control function approach yielded 
a more reasonable and intuitive coefficients for other attributes. Consider the estimates for prime 
and choice steaks. Under the conventional MNL estimates, the marginal utility of a prime 
(choice) steak was negative (positive) relative to the utility derived from the daily special. 
Holding all else constant, these estimates suggest individuals would be happier with a choice 
steak rather than a prime steak, a result which is inconsistent with the fact that prime steaks are 
of higher quality and are almost universally higher priced.  The corrected MNL estimates depict 
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a more likely story, as both the prime and choice steak coefficients were positive, and the prime 
steak coefficient was greater than that of the choice steak, meaning people would, holding all 
else constant, choose a prime over a choice steak.   
 Focusing on the corrected MNL estimates, we see that restaurant patrons had a positive 
marginal utility of calories, such that for every additional calorie a menu item has, an 
individual’s utility increases by 0.0005 units. Based on previous research, this result is expected 
as people often link calories to taste, implying the more calories an item has, the better it tastes 
and the happier the consumer (Horgen and Brownell 2002).  
When calories were interacted with menu type, however, we found the marginal utility of 
calories fell. More specifically, the interactions between calories and the calorie-only (numeric 
calorie label) and the calorie+traffic light (symbolic calorie label) menus show that the marginal 
utility of calories fell 0.0003 and 0.0006, respectively, relative to the control menu. Only the later 
effect, however, was statistically significant.  That is, the numeric presentation of calorie 
information only (as mandated by the forthcoming law) was not significantly different from the 
control menu.  Symbolic presentation of calorie information significantly lowered the marginal 
utility of information. 
Because the model was estimated by interacting the treatment dummy variables with the 
calorie effect, the reported calorie effect shows the marginal utility of calories in the control 
menu and the coefficients on the interactions show the additional effects over and above the 
control.  Thus, the marginal utility of calories was: 0.0005 for the control menu with no calorie 
label, 0.0005-0.003=0.0002 for the menu with the numeric calorie label, and 0.005-0.0006=        
-0.0001 for the menu with the symbolic calorie label.  
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 The estimates also indicate that some menu categories are more preferred than others. For 
instance, the coefficients for salads, pasta, and vegetarian items were all significantly negative, 
implying diners would be happier eating the daily special over items from these categories 
holding all else constant. Of these categories, diners least preferred to order salads as this 
category had a marginal utility of -2.0356. Burgers, combo meals, and prime and choice steaks, 
conversely, were preferred to the daily special. 
 A key advantage of estimating a structural choice model over analyzing raw data is the 
ability to quantify how much people are willing to pay for certain menu items. For instance, an 
individual’s willingness-to-pay for a prime steak with 1,000 calories over a salad with 300 
calories is calculated as: [( ̃   ̃ 
               )  ( ̃   ̃ 
         )]   . Inserting the 
appropriate estimates, we find that, when no calorie label is present, an individual was willing to 
pay 
[(                  ) (                  )]
        
  $35.94 for the prime steak over the salad—an 
estimate that is well within the price variation present on the menu. Figure 1.3 illustrates this 
willingness-to-pay difference between steaks and salads for the three menu treatments. Notice 
the willingness-to-pay decreased by $1.62 and $3.26 for the numeric and symbolic calorie labels, 
respectively, relative to the control. This can be attributed to the fact that the marginal utility of 
calories falls in the calorie only and symbolic treatments. 
 Similarly, we can calculate a person’s willingness-to-pay for an item as its caloric content 
changes. Figure 1.4 displays how the willingness-to-pay for a hypothetical burger over the daily 
special changes as the number of calories in the hypothetical burger increases. When no calorie 
label was present, willingness-to-pay increases as the calorie content of the burger increases. We 
observed a similar relationship with the numeric calorie label, except that willingness-to-pay 
increased at a much slower rate. On the contrary, when the symbolic calorie label was present, a 
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negative relationship existed between willingness-to-pay and calories. In fact, at some point, a 
burger could have so many calories that the burger would have to be sold at a discount relative to 
the daily special to induce customers to order it. 
 
Simulated Impacts on Calories and Net Returns 
Federal legislative efforts have focused on information or labeling policies to combat rising 
obesity rates, yet other policy instruments such as pricing policies (i.e., “fat taxes” or “thin 
subsidies”) may be effective at achieving the same desired outcome.  
 Using the estimated model, we calculated the expected caloric intake and restaurant net 
returns (over food and preparation costs) per diner for four possible policy options: a numeric 
calorie label, a symbolic calorie label, a “fat tax,” and a “thin subsidy” based on equations (5) 
and (6). Recall for the “fat tax” that items with more than 800 calories (high-calorie or red light 
items) received a 10% price increase. Likewise, for the “thin subsidy,” items with 400 calories or 
less (low-calorie or green light items) were subject to a 10% price reduction.  We use the term 
“fat tax” loosely as the policy simulated taxes calories, not fat or fatness.   
 Table 1.3 reveals the expected caloric intake for each policy option. Notice the expected 
intake was 641.03 calories at the status quo (no calorie labels, no calorie taxes/subsidies). 
Comparing information and pricing policies, table 3 shows that the information policies 
outperformed either pricing policy in terms of reducing caloric intake, with the numeric and 
symbolic calorie labels reducing intake by 27.43 and 55.62 calories, respectively. Only the 
symbolic label reduction was significantly different from zero at the 5% level, however. The 
10% “thin subsidy” and “fat tax “only decreased caloric intake by 11.51 and 21.98 calories, 
respectively, neither of which was statistically different from zero.  Clearly the symbolic calorie 
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label (calorie+traffic light symbol) produced the greatest decrease in caloric intake, indicating 
that adding traffic light symbols to menus could enhance the effectiveness of the numeric calorie 
label currently being proposed. 
 Symbolic calorie labels may outperform the other policy options considered here in terms 
of influencing consumers to make lower-calorie choices; however, it is also important to 
consider the effect on restaurant net returns above food and preparation costs. Table 1.4 provides 
the simulated net return impacts for each policy option. If no information or pricing policy were 
enacted, the expected restaurant net return (over food and preparation costs) was 
$6.94/person/meal. Mandating a numeric or symbolic calorie label would reduce the expected 
net returns by $0.14 or $0.27, respectively, yet only the symbolic label produced a statistically 
significant reduction in restaurant net returns. In the case of pricing policies, a “fat tax” would 
actually result in a $0.16 (statistically insignificant) increase in restaurant net returns, but a “thin 
subsidy” would cause the largest ($0.34) decrease in net returns, which was statistically different 
from zero.  
 Striking a balance between consumer health and restaurant profitability will likely be 
challenging. While policymakers may want to mandate symbolic calorie labels because they 
produce the largest intake reductions (55.62 calories/meal), restaurants are likely to oppose this 
particular label because it also leads to significant reductions in net returns over food and 
preparation costs ($0.27/meal). Restaurants might instead promote the use of a “fat tax” because 
it does not negatively impact their net returns, yet policymakers may not be willing to trade the 
additional 33.64 calorie reduction which could be achieved via symbolic calorie labels. 
Ultimately, legislators will be forced to make a tradeoff, and our results suggest restaurants are 
likely to be on the losing end.  Making these tradeoffs is different when comparing different 
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units: calories lost by consumers to dollars lost by restaurants.  A cost benefit analysis is needed 
to translate the lost calories into a dollar-benefit; and this is the role provided by the value of 
information calculation.   
 
Value of Information 
Calculating the value of information for both the numeric and symbolic menus will allow us to 
translate the benefits of the policy measure from calories to dollars. Using equation (7), we found 
that the value of the numeric calorie labels was $0.03/diner/meal and the value of the symbolic 
calorie label was $0.13/diner/meal.  Thus, if a consumer dined out 100 times in a year, the value 
of information present in the symbolic calorie label would be $13.00/person/year. However, 
table 1.5 shows that the value of information associated with both numeric and symbolic calorie 
labels was not statistically different from zero. 
 Economists often apply benefit-cost ratios to determine if a particular policy should be 
pursued. If the ratio is greater than one, the policy is a viable option. Here, for a symbolic calorie 
label, the benefit to consumers is worth $0.13 and the cost to restaurants (in lost net returns) is 
$0.27, yielding a benefit-cost ratio of 0.481. Numeric calorie labels share a similar result, with an 
even smaller benefit-cost ratio of 0.214. These ratios indicate the benefits of the information do 
not outweigh the costs to the restaurants, implying these policy instruments are not economically 
efficient.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
With American obesity and overweight rates on the rise, policymakers have decided that 
consumers need to be re-educated on the foods they eat, especially the meals they eat away from 
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home. With the passage of the 2010 health care bill, chain restaurants, defined as having 20 or 
more outlets, will be required to provide calorie information for each item as well as a statement 
of the recommended daily caloric intake on all menus. Complete nutrition profiles for each item 
must also be available on site (FDA 2011). 
 The proposed legislation mandates that calorie information must be provided in a 
numeric format (FDA 2011); yet, to our knowledge, no other information formats have been 
researched or tested. With any educational program, how the information is presented can be just 
as important as which information is presented. Moreover, information or labeling policies are 
only one potential solution; consumers may respond just as much to price changes on menus 
such as “fat taxes” or “thin subsidies.” The purpose of this research was to examine a wide array 
of potential policy instruments to determine which performs the best at encouraging lower-
calorie choices. Additionally, this research reviewed each policy instrument from a restaurant’s 
perspective, examining how each instrument affected restaurant net returns above food and 
preparation costs. Finally, our study calculated the value of information consumers receive from 
two different labeling systems (numeric and symbolic calorie label). 
 Results of this study revealed menu labeling can influence food choice. When no calorie 
label was present, we found a greater proportion of higher-calorie meals (more than 800 calories) 
ordered than when either a numeric or symbolic calorie label was utilized. Note, however, the 
symbolic calorie label led to greater calorie reductions (55.6 cal/meal) than the numeric calorie 
label (27.4 cal/meal) currently proposed by the Food and Drug Administration. Each of the labels 
also outperformed the pricing policies at reducing caloric intake. Still, one is left to question: Is 
55 calories a substantial reduction? An individual could simply order water instead of a soft 
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drink and decrease his/her intake by 150 calories, almost three times the reduction produced by 
the symbolic calorie label! 
 From a restaurant’s point of view, the majority of policy instruments will damage its net 
returns (over food and preparation costs). Only a “fat tax” will not negatively affect net returns, 
but this option is an unlikely candidate for implementation because information policies led to 
greater decreases in calorie intake. Possibly even more frustrating for the restaurant community 
is that consumers only place a $0.13 ($0.03) per meal value on symbolic (numeric) calorie labels, 
yet these labels would reduce their net returns by $0.27 or $0.14 per meal, respectively. Either 
label leaves restaurants searching to make up for lost net returns, often accomplished by raising 
prices and thus, reducing consumer welfare. 
 Collectively, our results suggest neither information nor pricing policies are likely to 
produce the substantial reductions in caloric intake which policymakers would prefer to see. If an 
alternative is to be chosen, however, this study finds that a symbol should be required in addition 
to the number of calories on restaurant menus. For future research, a more effective course of 
action may be to more thoroughly examine all potential policy options (calorie labels, food 
taxes/subsidies, re-structuring of farm programs, etc.) in both fast-food and full-service 
restaurant settings. It could be the case that a symbolic calorie label works best in fast-food 
settings because people need to make decisions quickly, whereas another policy option may be 
best suited in full-service establishments where people have more time to thoughtfully consider 
all aspects (price, calories, and so on) of menu items. Undoubtedly, this could complicate 
legislation; nonetheless, a blanket policy for all restaurants may not be the most appropriate for 
achieving the government’s goal of a healthier America. 
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Figure 1.1 Percent of Total Meals Ordered Across Menu Types, Select Menu Items 
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  Figure 1.2 Percentage of Low, Medium, and High-Calorie Items Ordered by Menu Treatment 
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Figure 1.3 Willingness-to-pay for a Prime Steak (1,000 cal) over a Salad (300 cal) Across  
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  Figure 1.4 Willingness-to-pay for Burger over Daily Special across Menu Treatments 
  
28 
 
Table 1.1 Menu Items Selected for the Price Intervention  
Menu Item Calories 
Original 
Price 
New 
Price 
 Percent 
Change 
Bacon Cheese Burger 920 8.5 9.5 +11.76% 
Bleu Cheese Bacon Burger 920 8.5 9.5 +11.76% 
West Coast Cheese Burger 970 8.5 10 +17.65% 
West Coast Rancher Sandwich 590 9.5 8.5 -10.53% 
Cowboy Combo 1185 13 16 +23.08% 
Lentils 210 8 7 -12.50% 
Pinchitos 280 8 7 -12.50% 
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Table 1.2 Multinomial Logit (MNL) Model of Menu Item Choice 
Explanatory Variable Conventional MNL Corrected MNL
a
  
Price    -0.0285*** -0.1286** 
   (0.0106)
b
 (0.0627) 
Calories  -0.00005 0.0005 
   (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Calories*Calorie-Only Menu -0.0003 -0.0003 
                 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Calories*Calorie+Traffic Light Symbol Menu     -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Salad
c
    -1.5012*** -2.0356*** 
  (0.1396) (0.3567) 
Burger
c
     0.7079*** 0.2812 
  (0.1087) (0.3047) 
Combo
c
     1.5734*** 1.2504*** 
  (0.1106) (0.2449) 
Pasta
c
   -0.6848*** -0.9837*** 
  (0.1301) (0.2452) 
Veggie
c
   -0.5644*** -0.8851*** 
  (0.1511) (0.2699) 
Steak-Prime
c
 -0.7106** 2.2362 
  (0.3371) (1.8242) 
Steak-Choice
c
 0.1588 0.8177** 
  (0.1262) (0.4086) 
Residual for Menu Item Price   0.1086* 
    (0.0648) 
Log-likelihood -5373 -5371 
Number of Observations 1532 1532 
      
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a
 Corrected MNL estimates obtained using control function approach as discussed by Petrin and Train (2010). 
b
 Standard errors are in parentheses.  Standard errors for the corrected model were determined by bootstrapping. 
c
 Effects of each menu category are relative to the daily special. 
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Table 1.3 Simulated Calorie Impacts 
Policy Option 
E(Calories)         
Cal/Person/Meal 
Change from  
Status Quo 
Status Quo 641.03 
 
      (15.11)
a
 
       
  
Numeric Calorie Label 613.6 -27.43 
      (15.53) (21.67)
a
 
      
 
[-70.24, 19.66]
b
 
      
  
Symbolic Calorie Label 585.41 -55.62 
      (13.74) (20.05) 
      
 
[-98.36, -20.15] 
      
  
Fat Tax     619.05 -21.98 
      (16.87) (12.45) 
      
 
[-44.76, 3.22] 
      
  
Thin Subsidy   629.52 -11.51 
      (15.71) (6.40) 
      
 
[-25.55, 1.34] 
          
a
 Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
b
 95% Confidence intervals are in brackets. 
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Table 1.4 Simulated Net Return (Over Food and Preparation Costs) Impacts 
Policy Option 
E(Net Returns)         
$/Person/Meal 
Change from  
Status Quo 
Status Quo $6.94    
      ($0.21)
a
   
          
Numeric Calorie Label $6.80  -$0.14 
      ($0.19) ($0.12)
a
 
        [-$0.47, $0.11]
b
 
          
Symbolic Calorie Label $6.66  -$0.27 
      ($0.15) ($0.12) 
        [-$0.59, -$0.11] 
          
Fat Tax     $7.10 $0.16 
      ($0.23) ($0.23) 
        [-$0.05, $0.50] 
          
Thin Subsidy   $6.59  -$0.34 
      ($0.21) ($0.06) 
        [-$0.48, -$0.24] 
          
a
 Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
b
 95% Confidence intervals are in brackets. 
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Table 1.5 Value of Information (VOI) for Calorie Labels 
Calorie Label Mean VOI 
Symbolic Calorie Label vs. No Calorie Label $0.13  
      ($0.53)
a
 
      [-$0.76, $0.77]
b
 
        
Numeric Calorie Label vs. No Calorie Label $0.03  
      ($1.03) 
      [-$0.20, $0.33] 
        
a
 Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. 
b
 95% Confidence intervals are in brackets. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
DO CALORIE LABELS REDUCE CALORIC INTAKE? 
EVIDENCE FROM TWO FULL SERVICE RESTAURANTS 
 
The United States has experienced a precipitous rise in the rate of obesity. In 1995, all 50 states 
had obesity prevalence rates of less than 20%. In 2010, however, every state had an obesity 
prevalence rate of at least 20%, with twelve states having an obesity prevalence rate of 30% or 
higher (CDCP, 2011). The growth in obesity rates has sparked concern among medical 
professionals, insurance providers, and policymakers over the cost of increased weight. Behan et 
al. (2010) estimated the medical costs of obesity alone were $127 billion in 2009, while the 
entire economic cost of obesity (including costs associated with employee absenteeism, workers’ 
compensation claims, reduced employee productivity, etc.) was estimated at $270 billion per 
year in the U.S.  
 Given the costs of obesity, policymakers have sought ways to encourage healthier eating. 
One of the most recent efforts is reflected in the new mandatory calorie labeling policy for chain 
restaurants, which was included in the 2010 health care bill. Several cities and states had 
previously passed their own menu labeling policies, but this was the first federal legislation on 
the issue, and it aims to provide a uniform set of standards for chain restaurants across the 
country. The final guidelines have not been released by the Food and Drug Administration
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(FDA), but it is expected that restaurants with 20 or more outlets will be required to provide 
calorie information for all items on all menus and food tags, have full nutrition profiles for all 
menu items available on site, and provide a statement of the recommended daily caloric intake, 
2,000 calories/day (FDA, 2011). 
 The recent spike in menu labeling laws has incited a growing stream of research studying 
the effectiveness of calorie labels on restaurant menus. Thus far, much of the research has 
utilized an event-study approach. They study the mean pre- and post- caloric intake after a one-
time labeling intervention. Despite the commonalities in experimental design and labeling 
format, the results across studies have been quite mixed. Some studies conclude the calorie labels 
fulfill their intended purpose by reducing caloric intake (see Milich, Anderson, and Mills, 1976; 
Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen, 2011; Pulos and Leng, 2010; Roberto et al., 2010; Wisdom, 
Downs, and Loewenstein, 2010), while others find the label has virtually no effect on eating 
behavior (see Mayer et al., 1987; Harnack et al., 2008; Elbel et al., 2009; Finkelstein et al., 
2011). It should be noted that, even among studies finding an effect, the impact of the label is 
often marginal. For example, Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011) and Pulos and Leng (2010) 
each find that calorie labels only lead to a 15-calorie reduction, on average. 
 In this study, we contribute to the current body of labeling literature by examining: (1) 
alternative experimental designs, (2) alternative labeling formats, and (3) the effects of menu 
labels on consumers and restaurants. First, consider the traditional one-time labeling 
intervention. While this design is likely the most intuitive and easiest to implement, it does have 
some potential drawbacks. Particularly, a one-time intervention cannot always account for 
changes in preferences over time. For example, a researcher may decide to implement his/her 
labeling intervention in late September, at the end of summer and beginning of fall when 
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different vegetable offerings are making their way onto the table. While the changes in eating 
behavior pre- and post-intervention may be due to the addition of the menu label, there is also a 
possibility that the changes could be attributed to differences in preferences in summer and fall. 
One way to address this weakness is by employing an experimental design where the control and 
intervention conditions are examined simultaneously. In other words, some consumers receive a 
control menu with no nutritional information while others receive a menu with nutritional 
information provided for all menu items. It is important to note this design is also subject to 
criticism, as repeat diners may receive a different menu treatment on subsequent visits. This 
study implements both types of labeling interventions to obtain a more complete picture of the 
effectiveness of calorie labels in full service restaurants. 
 In terms of menu labeling format, the current literature has narrowly employed a numeric 
calorie label where the number of calories is listed by each menu item. The predominant use of 
this label is not surprising given the specifications set by early labeling legislation pieces (see 
CSPI, 2009 for local/state labeling laws under consideration before the federal legislation). 
However, it leaves one to question whether this is the best labeling format to influence consumer 
behavior. Berning, Chouinard, and McCluskey (2008) found that some groups of grocery store 
shoppers may be more responsive to what they describe as a summary label format (a star rating 
system) as opposed to a detailed label format revealing information about specific nutrients. 
Interestingly, though, alternative labeling formats have not been examined within the restaurant 
context. In this study, we compare the effectiveness of two labels at reducing caloric intake in 
full service restaurants: (1) the traditional numeric calorie label and (2) a symbolic calorie label 
which provides a “traffic light” symbol (used to indicate calorie ranges for each menu item) in 
addition to the number of calorie for each item. 
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 Finally, this study adds to the literature because it explores how menu labels affect both 
consumers and restaurants. The intent of the federal labeling legislation is to create a healthier 
America. While health is undoubtedly important, a full accounting of the policy impacts must 
also evaluate the financial impacts on restaurants. To date, only Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen 
(2011) have considered how restaurants may be affected by menu labels. While the authors 
conclude profit was unchanged after the provision of caloric information, it is worth noting that 
this study examined calorie labels in Starbucks, a restaurant whose sales are dominated by 
beverages rather than foods. Conversely, our study focuses on how menu labels affect more 
traditional full service restaurants, where food dishes are the primary source of revenue rather 
than beverages. 
 The overall purpose of this research is to take a broader approach at studying the impacts 
of menu labels in full service restaurants. Using data from two field experiments in two different 
restaurants (each employing different experimental designs and labeling formats), we determine 
the effectiveness of numeric and symbolic calorie labels at reducing caloric intake and ask how 
restaurants’ sales revenues are influenced by the implementation of menu labels. 
 In the next section, we describe our methods and findings from our first experiment in 
Restaurant 1. Next we discuss the differences in design between Restaurants 1 and 2 and follow 
with the methods and results obtained from our field experiment in Restaurant 2. The paper 
concludes with an overall discussion of the results and potential implications of this study. 
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Field Experiment 1: Effect of One-Time Numeric Calorie Intervention 
Our first experiment study uses an event-study approach to investigate the effect of introducing 
numeric calorie labels in a full service restaurant on the number of calories ordered and on 
restaurant revenue. 
 
Methods 
Daily lunch receipts were collected from September through November, 2010, at Restaurant 1, a 
full service, sit-down restaurant located on the Oklahoma State University campus at Stillwater, 
Oklahoma. Restaurant 1 serves faculty, staff, students, and off-campus patrons.  The restaurant 
had never previously been used for research purposes, making it unlikely diners would have any 
expectation of being part of a research study. 
 Throughout the data collection period, the restaurant offered 32 menu options. The 
average menu item price was $9.19, with the least and most expensive items priced at $4.00 and 
$14.00, respectively. The average number of calories per menu item was 387 calories, with the 
lowest and highest calorie options containing 120 and 660 calories, respectively. Caloric contents 
were obtained using The Food Processor nutrition analysis software. The head chef entered 
recipes for each menu option to generate the most accurate calorie counts. Although we were in 
possession of a complete nutrition facts panel for each menu item, we only utilize the number of 
calories, as this is the information being mandated in the new menu labeling law.  
In Restaurant 1, we utilized the traditional approach used in prior studies on the issue, a 
one-time labeling intervention. The original menu contained each item’s name, with a brief 
description and item price below the name. For the first six weeks (pre-intervention period), we 
collected receipts and examined food choices under the original menu format. Then, in the 
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seventh week, we changed the existing menu by including the calorie counts of each menu item 
next to the item’s name (item descriptions and prices remained beneath item names). We kept the 
calorie labels in place for the remainder of the experiment (weeks 7-14). All item names, 
descriptions, and prices were held constant over the fourteen week experiment, so that we could 
isolate the effect of the calorie labels. 
Data are analyzed using linear regressions, where total calories ordered per diner and 
total meal expenditures per diner serve as dependent variables. We initially analyze the effect of 
introducing the calorie label on total calories and total expenditures, but then we also add in 
control variables such as days of the week, a daily time trend, and the interaction between the 
calorie label and daily time trend. 
 
Results 
Restaurant 1 had a total of 2,150 patrons during the fourteen week field experiment: 824 patrons 
visited the restaurant during the pre-calorie label phase, while the remaining 1,326 patrons were 
exposed to the new menus containing calorie information for each menu item. Table 2.1 provides 
descriptive statistics comparing the pre- and post-calorie label groups for the main variables of 
interest. From the table, we can see that the label did not incite a large change in calories 
ordered. The pre-calorie label group ordered 622.44 calories per diner per meal (standard 
deviation of 194.43 calories), on average, while the post-calorie label group ordered 627.54 
calories/diner/meal (standard deviation of 207 calories), on average. This result reveals the 
calorie label actually increased, rather than decreased, mean caloric intake, a result incongruent 
with the intended purpose of the labeling legislation proposed by the FDA.  The difference in 
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mean calories ordered pre- and post-label intervention is not statistically different from zero 
according to a t-test. 
 Like total calories ordered, total meal expenditures also increased after the calorie label 
was instituted. Under the regular restaurant menu, diners spent $14.12 per person per meal 
(standard deviation of $3.45), on average; however, diners exposed to the calorie label increased 
their expenditures by $0.26 per meal (on average), pushing total expenditures to $14.38 per 
person per meal (standard deviation of $3.95). Again, the differences are not statistically 
different.  
 The results from table 2.1 are reproduced in the regressions reported in table 2.2, where 
we single out the effect of the calorie label on total calories ordered and total meal expenditures 
(see model 1 under each dependent variable). Table 2.2 shows that the marginal changes in total 
calories and total expenditures due to the calorie label are a 5.1 calorie and $0.26 increase, 
respectively. It is important to note, however, that the calorie label coefficient is not statistically 
significant in either model. Mayer et al. (1987), Harnack et al. (2008), Elbel et al. (2009), and 
Finkelstein et al. (2011) draw similar conclusions about the (lack of) effectiveness of calorie 
labels on caloric intake. However, note that unlike previous studies, our findings occurred in a 
full service restaurant where diners sat down and had ample time to read the menus.   
 Building on model 1, the second specifications include indicator variables for day of the 
week, a daily time trend, and the interaction between the calorie label and daily trend. Under this 
specification, we find that the presence of the calorie label again increased total calories ordered, 
this time on day zero by 16.24 calories per person per meal, on average (though still not 
statistically different from zero). Day of the week does not appear to significantly impact total 
calories ordered, but the daily time trend variable was negatively related to total calories ordered 
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(p < 0.05). This means that for each additional day into the field experiment, average total 
calories ordered decreased, on average, 2.53 calories. The interaction between the calorie label 
and daily trend was insignificant; so too was the linear effect of the label. In short, there is no 
evidence that the label intervention had any effect on the number of calories ordered. 
 Turning to total meal expenditures, after the introduction of control variables, we see the 
presence of a calorie label significantly increases total average expenditures by $1.66 per person 
per meal (p < 0.01). Coupling this finding with the fact that that the number of calories ordered 
was unaffected by the label suggests that the label caused diners to shift purchases to similar-
calorie yet higher-priced menu items.  Our study is not the first to find that revenues may be 
positively influenced by calorie labels.  Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011) found that calorie 
labels had either a neutral or positive impact on Starbucks’ revenue depending on store location. 
 While the findings may seem somewhat counter-intuitive (i.e., that labels increase 
revenue but do not change the number of calories ordered), it is worth noting Restaurant 1 
promotes relatively healthy eating. According to the restaurant’s website, its goal is to “create 
well balanced healthy options for guests without losing flavor and nutrients” (OSUa, 2011).  In 
this case, the information provided may have surprised restaurant patrons in a positive manner 
(i.e., “I’m eating better than I thought”) and lead them to reward themselves with an appetizer or 
dessert, for example (Wilcox et al., 2009; Vermeer et al., 2011).  
 
Field Experiment 2: Effect of Simultaneous Numeric and Symbolic Calorie Label 
Intervention 
In the previous field experiment, a one-time labeling intervention approach was employed 
because this has been standard practice in the majority of labeling studies. However, as discussed 
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previously, there can be a drawback of this design. Namely, this experimental approach may 
have difficulty separately identifying changes in consumer preferences over time. In Restaurant 
1, the labeling intervention occurred in October, so patrons in the pre-calorie label treatment may 
order differently than patrons in the post-calorie label treatment simply due to the change in 
seasons. Our regression results support the notion that total calories ordered is affected by more 
than just menu type, as the daily trend variable was significant at the 5% level. We adjust for this 
potential weakness in Restaurant 2, where all labeling treatments are studied simultaneously in 
an event study framework. 
 In Restaurant 2, we also move beyond the simple numeric calorie label implemented in 
Restaurant 1.  Although the numeric calorie labels were used in Restaurant 1 in an effort to 
mimic previous labeling research as well as the FDA’s proposed menu labeling legislation, it is 
possible to imagine other presentation formats which might be more effective – especially 
considering our finding that the numeric labels had little to no effect.  Thus, in Restaurant 2, we 
supplement the numeric calorie information with a traffic light symbol for each menu item to 
indicate a specific calorie range. The traffic light symbols should allow diners to process the 
nutrition information more quickly and easily and can serve as a guide for those consumers who 
are unaware of how many calories should be consumed on a daily basis.  Using data from 
Restaurant 2, we can directly compare the effectiveness of the symbolic labels to the numeric-
only format.   
 
Methods 
From August to October 2010, daily lunch receipts were collected from Restaurant 2, another 
full service, sit-down restaurant in Stillwater, Oklahoma. Restaurant 2 is upscale relative to 
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Restaurant 1 and boasts that it “unites western and cowboy culture with a memorable dining 
experience” (OSUb, 2011).  Whereas Restaurant 1 places an emphasis on providing “healthy 
options” for diners, Restaurant 2 focuses on creating a quality dining atmosphere which includes 
offering rich comfort foods and steaks. Similar to Restaurant 1, Restaurant 2 is located on the 
Oklahoma State University campus but is frequented by residents without affiliation with the 
University.  As with Restaurant 1, Restaurant 2 had never previously been used for research 
purposes, making it unlikely diners would have any expectation of being part of a research study. 
Restaurant 2 offered a total of 51 menu options over the twelve-week experiment, 
including items such as soups and salads, burgers, pasta, and even prime steaks. Restaurant 2 
offered a wide range of item prices and caloric contents. The average menu item contained 
approximately 580 calories, with the lowest and highest calorie options containing 50 and 1540 
calories, respectively. In terms of pricing, the average item cost $15.88, with the least and most 
expensive items listing at $3 (cup of soup) and $58 (prime steak), respectively.  
Rather than using a one-time labeling intervention, Restaurant 2 was divided into three 
sections, each of which was assigned to a particular menu treatment. The menu treatments varied 
by the type and amount of caloric information provided to restaurant patrons. The control menu 
treatment contained no caloric information, just each item’s name, description, and price. The 
numeric or calorie-only menu treatment retained all the information from the control menu and 
added the number of calories for each menu item. Calorie information was listed in parentheses 
before each item’s price. The calorie-only menu essentially replicates the post-labeling 
intervention menu in Restaurant 1. In the symbolic or calorie+traffic light menu treatment, diners 
continued to receive information regarding each item’s name, description, price, and caloric 
content.  In addition, a green, yellow, or red traffic light symbol was added for each menu item. 
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The traffic lights served as indicators for different calorie ranges; green light items contained 400 
calories or less, yellow light items had between 401 and 800 calories, and red light items 
contained more than 800 calories. Calorie ranges were designed so that each traffic light color 
would be well represented on the menu. 
Recall that our study design in Restaurant 2 differed from Restaurant 1 in that all menu 
treatments were evaluated simultaneously; thus, at any given time, all three menus were in use 
by restaurant diners. This design presents a few challenges. First, it is imperative that diners at 
each table receive the same menu and that the entire table receives the correct menu treatment. 
To ensure this, the authors emphasized the need for consistency to restaurant staff and the lead 
author visited the restaurant daily to monitor the progress of the field experiment. Secondly, 
there is the possibility that repeat customers may utilize information they received from a prior 
dining experience to make a meal selection on a subsequent dining occasion, even if the 
information is not present during the subsequent visit. If this occurs, the impact of the labels 
would wear off over time. This is an issue we control for in the data analysis. 
Data analysis for Restaurant 2 is conducted in virtually the same manner as Restaurant 1. 
Linear regressions are estimated with total calories ordered per diner and total meal expenditures 
per diner as dependent variables. Again, two model specifications are used for each dependent 
variable. The first specification only examines the effects of the two types of calorie labels on 
total calories and total expenditures. In the second specification, we control for variables such as 
days of the week, a daily time trend, and the interaction between each labeling treatment and the 
daily time trend.  
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Results 
Over the twelve-week field experiment, 946 patrons visited Restaurant 2, with 302, 301, and 343 
patrons assigned to the no calorie, calorie-only, and calorie+traffic light labeling treatments, 
respectively. From table 2.3, we can see that diners in the no calorie label treatment ordered 
740.75 calories per person per meal, on average (standard deviation of 342.07 calories). This is 
about 120 calories greater than diners who were in the same labeling treatment (pre-labeling 
intervention) in Restaurant 1. For diners assigned to the calorie-only labeling treatment, we find 
that they ordered 708.21 calories (standard deviation of 337.25 calories), on average, which is 
about 32.5 calories less than the control treatment.  However, the change is not statistically 
significant according to a t-test.  
When the traffic light symbol is added to the numeric calorie information, we find the 
average diner ordered 672.05 calories (standard deviation of 321.04 calories), resulting in a 
statistically significant 68.7 calorie reduction relative to the control. Hence, the addition of the 
traffic light symbol to the existing calorie information doubled the effectiveness of the standard 
numeric label (as currently proposed). 
 Turning to total meal expenditures, table 2.3 reveals that, on average, Restaurant 2 diners 
spent $12.98 per person per meal (standard deviation of $7.06) when no nutritional information 
is present. When the calorie-only label was added to the menu, average total expenditures fell by 
$0.51 per person per meal. Total expenditures among diners with the symbolic calorie label 
(calorie+traffic light label) averaged $13.69 (standard deviation of $8.27), which is higher than 
the control but not statistically different.  
 Moving to the regression results in table 2.4, we see that the findings from table 2.3 are 
replicated in the model 1 specifications for total calories ordered and total meal expenditures. 
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The calorie-only and calorie+traffic light labels reduced total calories ordered by 32.5 and 68.7 
calories, respectively, yet only the effect of the calorie+traffic light label is statistically different 
from zero (p < 0.01). Neither of the calorie label treatments significantly impacted total meal 
expenditures.  
The second model specifications include indicator variables for day of the week, a daily 
time trend, and interactions between each menu labeling treatment and the daily time trend.  In 
the case of total calories ordered, we see the calorie+traffic light label had a similar effect on 
calories ordered (approximately a 74 calorie reduction, on average); however, this reduction is 
no longer statistically different from zero. Curiously, the addition of the control variables 
dramatically changed the estimated effect of the calorie-only label.  The second model 
specification suggests that the total calories ordered was 120 calories lower, on average, than the 
control; a differences which is marginally significant (p = 0.0514).  Despite the size of this 
effect, it is important to note that the interaction between the calorie-only label and the daily time 
trend is positive, so the marginal effect of the calorie-only label is actually 
                
                   
   
-120.12 + 3.26*Daily Trend.  Thus, the effect of the calorie-only label relative to the control at, 
say, day 30 was only -120.12+3.26*30 = -22.32.  Figure 2.1 shows the predicted mean by 
labeling treatment at the beginning, middle, and end of the study (all on Tuesday).  At the 
beginning of the study, the results show that the calorie-only treatment appears to generate fewer 
calories ordered than the control; however, by the end of the study the reverse is true.  The 95% 
confidence intervals overlap at all three dates shown, indicating differences in predicted means 
are not statistically significant.   
Diners eating on Tuesdays ordered about 61 fewer calories (on average) than diners 
eating on Fridays. This could be explained in part by Restaurant 2’s close proximity to the 
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University hotel. The restaurant may receive more travelers toward the end of the week, 
especially Fridays. If these diners are on vacation or visiting for a University event (i.e., football 
game), they may be less concerned with the “healthfulness” of their food choices. 
Turning to the total meal expenditures model, the results reveal no significant effects for 
the calorie label or time trend coefficients.   
 
Discussion 
Results from Restaurant 2 reveal a similar fate for the calorie-only label as proposed by current 
legislation: it is relatively ineffective. There was some weak evidence that the calorie-only label 
might reduce total calories ordered (as intended) in the very early part of the study, but by the 
end of the study there was no difference.  The addition of a traffic light symbol appeared overall 
more effective, and at mean values it is twice as effective as numeric calorie-only labels (32.5 
average calorie reduction for the calorie-only label vs. 68.7 average reduction for the 
calorie+traffic light label). Figure 2.1 does reveal there may be some type of learning by repeat 
diners as the trend for total calories ordered under the control menu is negative (though not 
significant). Neither labeling treatment proved to significantly impact restaurant revenue.  
 
Conclusion 
With obesity and other diet-related diseases on the rise, U.S. policymakers are focused on 
designing legislation to help Americans help themselves at making “healthier” (generally 
interpreted as lower-calorie) food choices. Since an increasing proportion of food dollars are 
spent away from home, restaurants are the target of current legislative efforts. In fact, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) has currently proposed that chain restaurants (those with 20 or 
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more outlets) will be required to provide calorie information for all menu items on all menus and 
menu boards along with a statement of the daily recommended caloric intake. Additional 
nutrition information (fat, sodium, sugar, etc.) on menu items must also be available on site per a 
diner’s request (FDA, 2011). 
 The increased attention on menu labeling laws has sparked a large stream of research 
regarding the potential (and actual, in some cases) effectiveness of these labels. Unfortunately, 
many studies leave themselves open to some common weaknesses in their experimental design 
(i.e., participant awareness of an ongoing study); further, the current literature has solely focused 
on the numeric calorie label as proposed by the FDA – no study has considered an alternative 
(for example, symbolic) labeling format. In this study we address some of these issues by 
conducting two separate field experiments in full-service restaurants using different experimental 
designs and multiple labeling formats. This study also adds to the literature by examining how 
the labels affect parties beyond the consumer; namely, we study how menu labels influence total 
meal expenditures. 
 In Restaurant 1, we employed the standard experimental design commonly found in other 
labeling studies: a one-time labeling intervention. Here, we also used the customary numeric 
calorie label where the number of calories is listed next to each menu item. Results of our 
experiment reveal that the numeric calorie label had no effect on the number of calories ordered 
by diners; in fact, the average number of calories ordered actually increased (though not  
significantly) after the label was implemented. Like calories ordered, we also find that total meal 
expenditures increased after the label was implemented, a result which might help to assuage the 
restaurant industry’s fear that the labels will negatively affect their bottom line.  
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 Whereas Restaurant 1 followed a more traditional research design, Restaurant 2 had some 
distinct differences. First, the effects of the different labeling formats were evaluated 
simultaneously (as opposed to a pre- and post-intervention comparison). This design was used so 
that any changes in preferences across time (i.e., season changes, day of the week) would not be 
confounded with the menu treatments. Secondly, in Restaurant 2 we opted to use two menu 
labeling formats: (1) a numeric calorie label like the label in Restaurant 1, and (2) a symbolic 
calorie label where a “traffic light” symbol was used for each item in addition to the numeric 
calorie information.  
 Restaurant 2 results reveal that both labeling formats behaved as expected: each of the 
calorie labels reduced average calories ordered per diner; however, only the symbolic format was 
statistically significant. The symbolic calorie label outperformed its numeric counterpart, 
producing a calorie reduction twice as large as the numeric calorie label.  
 Ultimately, this study provides evidence that the numeric calorie label, as currently 
proposed by FDA, will have limited effectiveness at reducing caloric intake.  If helping 
Americans curb their daily caloric intake is the goal of policymakers, their efforts may be more 
successful if some type of symbolic label was used in conjunction with the number of calories. 
Secondly, this research reveals that calorie labels do not affect revenue.  
 One question this study did not address is why traffic light symbols might be more 
effective than simple numeric statements at reducing caloric intake. It could be that the symbols 
are more easily and quickly interpreted by diners. That is, the cost of information acquisition 
might be lower for symbolic labels. A different interpretation, however, is that the labels go 
beyond information provision and send a normative statement about what the consumer should 
order. A red traffic-light, after all, is synonymous with “STOP.” While many people are 
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relatively comfortable with the federal government taking on the role of providing unbiased 
information to facilitate market transactions, at least some subset of the population is likely to be 
less enthusiastic about policies that are viewed as paternalistic. Moreover, determination of 
cutoffs for traffic light labels are likely to be open to political manipulation by interested parties 
who do not want to find themselves on the wrong side of yellow. We leave to future research 
some of these challenges associated with traffic light labeling. 
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Figure 2.1 Predicted Number of Calories Ordered by Labeling Treatment and Day in  
                  Restaurant 2 (note: bars show 95% confidence intervals of predicted means) 
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Table 2.1 Consumption and Expenditure Statistics, Restaurant 1             
                      
Variable   Labeling Intervention N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum 
                      
Total Calories  Pre-Calorie Label 824 622.44 194.43 120.00 470.00 590.00 750.00 1400.00 
                      
    Post-Calorie Label 1326 627.54 207.00 120.00 450.00 595.20 770.00 1470.00 
                      
    Pooled 2150 625.58 202.24 120.00 450.00 590.00 760.00 1470.00 
                      
Total 
Expenditures Pre-Calorie Label 824 $14.12 $3.45 $5.00 $12.00 $14.00 $16.00 $25.50 
                      
    Post-Calorie Label 1326 $14.38 $3.95 $5.00 $11.50 $14.00 $17.00 $33.00 
                      
    Pooled 2150 $14.28 $3.77 $5.00 $12.00 $14.00 $16.50 $33.00 
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Table 2.2 Linear Regression Estimates for Two Model Specifications, Restaurant 1 
            
  Dependent Variable: Total Calories   Dependent Variable: Total Expenditures 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 622.44
**
    649.37
**
    $14.12
**
    $14.56
**
 
     (7.05)
a
   (16.00)   ($0.13)   ($0.30) 
Menu Label
b
   5.10   16.24   $0.26      $1.66
**
 
   (0.57)   (33.85)   ($0.17)   ($0.63) 
Tuesday
c
   -12.26      -$0.25 
     (12.75)       ($0.24) 
Wednesday
c
     3.63      -$0.24 
     (14.12)       ($0.26) 
Thursday
c
    13.33       $0.11 
     (12.79)       ($0.24) 
Daily Trend     -2.53
*
      -$0.03 
      (1.14)       ($0.02) 
Menu Label*Daily Trend    1.43     -$0.02 
     (1.42)      ($0.03) 
            
Number of Observations 2150 2150   2150 2150 
 
* Denotes 5% significance, ** Denotes 1% significance 
a
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors   
b
Effect of calorie labels present on menus relative to no calorie labels 
c
Effect of day of the week relative to Friday  
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Table 2.3 Consumption and Expenditure Statistics, Restaurant 2             
                      
Variable   Labeling Treatment N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum 
                      
Total Calories  Calorie+Traffic Light Label 343 672.05 321.04 50.00 370.00 620.00 890.00 1680.00 
                      
    Calorie-Only Label 301 708.21 337.25 103.00 417.00 640.00 920.00 1680.00 
                      
    No Calorie Label 302 740.75 342.07 70.00 450.00 717.50 970.00 1813.00 
                      
    Pooled 946 705.48 333.89 50.00 410.00 660.00 920.00 1813.00 
                      
Total 
Expenditures Calorie+Traffic Light Label 343 $13.69 $8.27 $3.00 $9.38 $11.75 $15.00 $63.00 
                      
    Calorie-Only Label 301 $12.47 $4.83 $6.25 $9.50 $11.60 $14.00 $49.00 
                      
    No Calorie Label 302 $12.98 $7.06 $5.00 $8.54 $11.50 $14.00 $61.90 
                      
    Pooled 946 $13.07 $6.95 $3.00 $9.00 $11.54 $14.00 $63.00 
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Table 2.4 Linear Regression Estimates for Two Model Specifications, Restaurant 2 
            
  Dependent Variable: Total Calories   Dependent Variable: Total Expenditures 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept   740.75
**
      840.07
**
      $12.98
**
    $12.43
**
 
    (19.16)
a
     (48.18)     ($0.40)   ($1.01) 
Calorie+Traffic Light Label
b
    -68.70
**
   -74.44     $0.71   $2.03 
  (26.28)    (59.94)     ($0.54)   ($1.25) 
Calorie-Only Label
b
  -32.54  -120.12   -$0.51   $1.03 
   (27.12)   (61.59)    ($0.57)   ($1.29) 
Tuesday
c
     -61.27
*
      -$0.26 
      (31.06)       ($0.65) 
Wednesday
c
   -30.42     -$0.72 
     (29.10)      ($0.61) 
Thursday
c
   -15.52     -$0.58 
     (30.17)       ($0.63) 
Daily Trend    -2.83       $0.04 
      (1.52)       ($0.03) 
Calorie+Traffic Light Label*Daily Trend   0.10     -$0.05 
      (2.10)       ($0.04) 
Calorie-Only Label*Daily Trend     3.26     -$0.06 
     (2.15)      ($0.04) 
            
Number of Observations 946 946   946 946 
 
* Denotes 5% significance, ** Denotes 1% significance 
a
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
b
Effect of calorie+traffic light and calorie-only labels relative to no calorie labels 
c
Effect of day of the week relative to Friday 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
LOOKING AT THE LABEL AND BEYOND: THE EFFECTS OF CALORIES LABELS, HEALTH 
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND DEMOGRAPHICS ON CALORIC INTAKE IN RESTAURANTS 
 
In 1980, about 32% of food expenditures occurred outside the home. By 2010, the figure had 
increased to nearly 44% (ERS, 2011). Although there is a general consensus that, on average, 
caloric intake tends to be higher for meals consumed away from home than at home (Stewart, 
2011), relatively less is known about who consumes fewer or greater calories away from home 
and how different people might respond to interventions designed to improve the healthfulness 
of food consumed away from home. A number of efforts have focused on providing consumers 
information about the foods they eat, often using nutrition labels at the point of purchase. With 
the rise in eating away from home, nutrition labels have become common on many restaurant 
menus. Research on the effects of nutrition labels in restaurant-type settings dates back to the 
1970s (Milich, Anderson, and Mills, 1976). Despite the growing literature on nutrition labeling 
in restaurant settings since that time, there are still no definitive conclusions which can be drawn. 
Some studies find labeling influences food choice while others say it has no significant effect 
(see Harnack and French, 2008, for a review of the labeling literature).  
Despite the mixed results, many people continue to advocate the menu labeling laws. The 
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most prominent example is contained in the 2010 healthcare bill which mandates chain 
restaurants to provide calorie information on all menu forms (FDA, 2011). The more recent 
research has advanced the literature by studying the effects of menu labels in real (rather than 
laboratory or experimental) restaurant settings (Elbel et al., 2009; Pulos and Leng, 2010; 
Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen, 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2011; Ellison, Lusk, and Davis, 2012). 
Unfortunately, moving the labels into a real-world setting has not settled the debate on the 
effectiveness of menu labels, as these studies also generated conflicting results on whether menu 
labels significantly reduce caloric intake. 
 The lack of consensus on the effectiveness of menu labeling suggests that there may be 
more to the story. That previous studies have employed similar experimental designs yet reach 
different conclusions suggests the discrepancy may relate to differences in the types of people 
involved in the studies.  People self-select into different types of restaurants, and it is possible 
that menu labels are more influential for some groups of people than others. Consider health 
consciousness, for example. Individuals who are highly health conscious likely possesses a large 
amount of health/nutrition awareness and knowledge, so the label will probably have minimal 
influence on their food choices because such individuals already know which foods are lower 
calorie. People with low health consciousness, on the other hand, may find the label provides 
novel information which can be used to select a lower-calorie menu item. If such a phenomenon 
exists, it is possible that research conducted in restaurants that attract more health conscious 
individuals (a trait likely correlated with income and education) would be less likely to find 
menu labels influential than research conducted in restaurants with less health conscious 
individuals.   
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 The impact of menu labels may also vary with demographic factors, such as gender, 
income, age, and education. Glanz et al. (1998) found that nutrition is more important to women 
and older individuals; thus, these groups may be more responsive to menu labels as opposed to 
young males. Surprisingly, the menu labeling literature has largely neglected the impacts of 
demographics and attitudinal characteristics. There have been several studies on the types of 
people who eat at fast food restaurants (see Rydell et al., 2008 for a review), but little work has 
actually examined what people eat once inside the restaurant. In other words, there has been no 
segmentation between low-, medium-, and high-calorie diners based on demographic variables, a 
gap the present study aims to fill. 
In this paper, we also investigate the effect of the format in which calories are displayed 
on menu labels. The vast majority of labeling studies have provided the number of calories for 
each menu item. From the literature, it is clear this type of label has limited effectiveness, which 
leads us to ask: is there a more effective way to convey caloric information? Ellison, Lusk, and 
Davis (2012) compare the effectiveness of symbolic versus numeric menu labeling and found 
that symbolic labeling led to lower caloric intake, on average, than numeric labeling. An open 
question this study aims to answer is whether symbolic information might be more influential on 
those consumers with limited nutrition knowledge (those who are less health conscious).  
The overall purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of restaurant patrons’ 
choices in the face of differing nutrition labels. More specifically, we will determine which types 
of people are most responsive to nutrition labeling on restaurant menus by examining the 
relationship between caloric intake and (1) menu labeling format, (2) health consciousness, and 
(3) demographic factors.  
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Data and Experimental Design 
Survey data were collected for two weeks during the 2010 Fall semester at the Rancher’s Club, a 
restaurant on the Oklahoma State University campus. Using the experimental design of Ellison, 
Lusk, and Davis (2012), the restaurant was split into three sections. Each section was assigned to 
a unique menu treatment. All treatments listed the name, description, and price for each menu 
item but the caloric information differed across treatments. Diners in the control menu treatment 
received no nutritional information, patrons in the calorie-only menu treatment were provided 
the number of calories in parentheses before each item’s price, and individuals in the 
calorie+traffic light menu treatment were presented with a green, yellow, or red traffic light 
symbol (indicating specific calorie ranges) in addition to the numeric caloric information 
preceding each item’s price. Calorie ranges were chosen so that each traffic light color would be 
well represented on the menu. Green light options contained 400 calories or less, yellow light 
options had between 401 and 800 calories, and red light options consisted of more than 800 
calories. 
 Upon completion of their meal, restaurant patrons were asked to complete a survey.  Prior 
to this point, diners were unaware that their prior dining choices had been recorded as a part of 
the research study. Using the restaurant’s computerized record-keeping system, we were able to 
match up each diner’s actual choices with their survey responses. Our data set consists of the 
survey responses and orders of 138 diners. Summary statistics regarding the demographic 
composition of our sample are presented in table 3.1. Although the restaurant is open to the 
entire community, table 3.1 shows that a large proportion of diners who frequent this 
establishment are young (approximately 70% are between 18 and 35 years old) and are currently 
students at Oklahoma State University (63%).  The relatively high proportion of students in the 
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sample might also be attributed to the timing of the survey-portion of this study, which took 
place near the end of the semester when many students attempt to draw down the balance on 
their bursar account. 
The one-page survey consisted of 15 questions, and was completed by diners in 
approximately five to ten minutes. Survey questions sought to learn about diners’: (1) 
demographic characteristics, (2) levels of health consciousness, (3) frequency of and reasons for 
dining at the Rancher’s Club, and (4) method of menu item selection (i.e., whether items were 
selected based on taste, price, healthfulness, etc). On the back of the survey, participants were 
presented a menu (matching their designated treatment) and subjects were asked three additional 
questions: which menu item(s) they ordered, if they ordered dessert, and what they had to drink. 
Figure 3.1 presents the exact survey given to participants.   
 One of the key variables in this analysis is health consciousness.  Following Kraft and 
Goodell (1993) and Berning, Chouinard, and McCluskey (2008), we measured this construct by 
asking participants to answer three five-point Likert scale questions regarding their daily caloric 
intake, fat intake, and use of nutrition labels (for exact phrasing, refer to questions 8, 9, and 10 in 
figure 3.1). Summing the values across the three questions provides a person’s level of health 
consciousness; scores could range from three to fifteen, with fifteen representing the most health 
conscious consumer. Although Berning, Chouinard, and McCluskey (2008) used nine items to 
measure health consciousness, we used only three questions given the need to quickly acquire 
the necessary information in the restaurant setting.   
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Model and Data Analysis 
The first part of our analysis utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to determine 
factors affecting diners’ levels of caloric intake. In this study, we disaggregate total caloric intake 
into two components: (1) main entrée calories consumed from the main portion of the meal, and 
(2) extra calories derived from extra items consumed over the course of the meal, such as drinks, 
desserts, additional side items such as soup or salad which are served before the main course, etc. 
Many of these extra items were not listed on the menu, and in concordance with the new federal 
labeling law, they were thus not required to possess a menu label.  The model for calorie intake 
type m (m = entrée calories, extra calories) by individual i is specified as follows: 
 
(1)      
    
    
        
        
       
           
          
                      
              
          
            
             
 
where    is the intercept,   , …,    are the effects of the calorie+traffic light (    ) and calorie-
only (    ) menu labeling formats, health consciousness (   ), gender (       ), status as a 
current student (        ), college education (          ), and party size (      ) on caloric 
intake,    and   are the effects of the interactions between each menu labeling format 
(calorie+traffic light and calorie-only) and health consciousness on caloric intake, and 
    (    
 ) is a random error term. It is important to note age and income variables were 
originally included in the model, but neither significantly affected caloric intake in the entrée or 
extra calorie specifications. Thus, for sake of parsimony, these variables were removed from the 
final model as shown in equation (1), however it should be noted that the sign and significance of 
the remaining variables are unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of the age and income 
variables. 
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 Despite mixed results from previous studies, we hypothesize lower caloric intake among 
those individuals who receive menus providing nutritional information (the calorie+traffic light 
and calorie-only menus in this study) compared to those individuals who receive no nutritional 
information; i.e., we hypothesize   < 0 and     < 0. Research has shown consumers have a 
tendency to underestimate the caloric contents of their meal choices (Burton et al., 2006; 
Chandon and Wansink, 2007), so the nutritional label corrects the misperception and may lead to 
lower-calorie choices. Additionally, we expect these negative relationships to hold more strongly 
in the entrée calorie specification as opposed to the extra calorie specification. This is mostly due 
to the fact that many of the extra calorie items (i.e., drinks and desserts) are not included on the 
menu (and, thus, not subject to having a posted calorie label), meaning diners are less aware of 
their potential (un)healthfulness. 
 Secondly, we hypothesize a negative relationship between health consciousness and 
caloric intake (    ). The more health conscious a person is (i.e., the more a person monitors 
his/her calorie and/or fat intake or spends time reading nutrition labels), the greater amount of 
nutrition knowledge/awareness the individual has, and thus, the fewer calories that individual is 
expected to order.  
 Despite the hypothesis that more health conscious individuals will consume fewer 
calories, we expect higher health conscious individuals to be less influenced by menu labels. 
Consider the case of an individual who (1) is high in health consciousness and (2) receives a 
menu with nutritional information. If the individual has a high level of health consciousness, 
he/she probably already has reasonably accurate perceptions of the calorie contents of menu 
items, meaning the nutritional information provided on the menu is of little value to this 
restaurant patron. In other words, we hypothesize a high level of health consciousness will 
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moderate the effect of menu labeling format. Thus, we hypothesize that menu labeling format 
will lead to the greatest calorie reductions for those individuals who are less health conscious 
(i.e., we hypothesize      and     ). 
 Inspection of the data revealed large differences in the variances in caloric intake across 
the three menu labeling treatments, suggesting the possibility of heteroskedasticity. Test results 
indicated that heteroskedasticity was present in both model specifications. To correct for this, we 
use White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
 In the second portion of our analysis, we focus on determining what types of people 
(male vs. female, older vs. younger, etc.) are low-, medium-, and high-calorie diners. We again 
consider both entrée calories ordered and extra calories ordered. However, instead of examining 
them as continuous variables, we segregate people into low, medium, and high categories. For 
the entrée calories, we used the intuitive cutoff points corresponding to our traffic light 
specifications. Thus, low-calorie diners were those diners who ordered 400 entrée calories or less 
(in other words, they ordered a green light entrée). Similarly, medium-calorie diners ordered 
between 401 and 800 entrée calories (a yellow light entrée), and high-calorie diners ordered 
more than 800 entrée calories (a red light entrée).  
 Defining the low, medium, and high levels of extra calories, on the other hand, was more 
challenging. Recall that extra calories are defined as those calories obtained from food choices 
beyond that of the main entrée – this could include additional side items like a soup or salad, 
desserts, and drinks. For our analysis, we opted to classify low-calorie diners as those people 
who ordered zero extra calories. These diners strictly adhered to their main entrée choice and did 
not supplement their meal with any additional sides or dessert. It should be pointed out that 
patrons ordering only a diet soft drink in addition to their entrée would still fall into the low-
63 
 
calorie diners as diet drinks contain zero calories. Medium-calorie diners were classified as those 
who ordered between one and 250 extra calories, and high-calorie diners ordered more than 250 
extra calories. 
 Once the low-, medium-, and high-calorie categories are established for both entrée 
calories and extra calories, we calculated the mean values for a host of variables under each 
category, including gender, age, income, and education. The average levels of health 
consciousness are also compared across the categories of diners as well as the proportion of 
people who responded that taste or health was the most important characteristic when making a 
menu selection. A dummy variable for the menu labeling treatment to which an individual was 
assigned was also included to determine whether one format lead to more low (or even high) 
calorie diners than another. Finally, we include variables relating to whether individuals were 
repeat diners and their reason for visiting the restaurant (business vs. lunch with friends). 
Because the majority of our variables were discrete, we used Chi-squared tests to test for 
difference between the types of diners. Only health consciousness was continuous, so we 
performed an ANOVA test to determine if there was any significant difference across low-, 
medium- and high-calorie diners.  
 
Results 
We first compare the average number of entrée, extra, and total calories ordered across the three 
menu formats. Figure 3.2 reveals that, in terms of entrée calories, the calorie-only and 
calorie+traffic light labeling treatments resulted in lower caloric intake relative to the control 
menu with no caloric information. Note, however, that the calorie+traffic light menu label led to 
a significantly fewer entrée calories ordered (significant at p < 0.05 level) compared to the other 
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two labeling formats (114 and 129 entrée calories fewer, on average, compared to the calorie-
only and control menus, respectively). Turning to extra calories, diners receiving menus with 
nutritional information actually order more extra calories as opposed to those diners who receive 
no nutritional information (though the difference is not statistically different from zero). These 
results suggest that diners who receive menus with calorie labels may be experiencing a licensing 
effect in that ordering a lower-calorie entrée gives a diner license to order an extra side item or 
dessert (Wilcox et al., 2009; Vermeer et al., 2011). 
Combining the entrée and extra calorie measures gives us the average total calories 
ordered under each menu treatment. The combined effect of the entrée and extra orders show that 
the calorie-only label actually increased average caloric intake compared to the control menu. 
The calorie+traffic light label, conversely, continued to reduces total calorie intake (by 69 and 
121 calories, on average, compared to the control and calorie-only menus; however, only the 
latter is significant at the 5% level). 
 
Regression Analysis 
First consider the regression results for entrée calories. Table 3.2 shows that both the 
calorie+traffic light and calorie-only labels significantly reduce entrée calories ordered (by 
496.34 and 610.69 calories, respectively), thus   < 0 and   < 0 as hypothesized. Based on figure 
2, one might have expected the calorie+traffic light label to have a greater reduction in entrée 
calories than the calorie-only label; however, it is important to consider the interactions between 
each menu treatment and the health consciousness score when interpreting the mean effect of a 
menu treatment. Table 3.2 reveals that both interactions between menu treatment and health 
consciousness are significantly positive, indicating the effect of the labels are less pronounced 
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for more health conscious individuals. The marginal effect of the calorie+traffic light label 
relative to the control is 
        
    
  -496.34 + 38.16*HC, and the marginal effect of the calorie-
only label relative to the control is 
        
    
   -610.69 + 55.79*HC. For a person with the lowest 
level of health consciousness (HC = 3), the calorie+traffic light and calorie-only labels lead to 
381.86 and 443.32 fewer calories ordered relative to the control menu, respectively.  By contrast, 
when the level of health consciousness goes up (HC = 9), the marginal effects are only -152.90 
and -108.58 for the calorie+traffic light and calorie-only labels, respectively. Thus, calorie labels 
lead to greater caloric reductions among the least health conscious. Comparing the two calorie 
labels, we find that at low levels of health consciousness, the calorie-only label leads to larger 
calorie reductions; however, at higher levels of health consciousness, the calorie+traffic light is 
more effective at reducing entrée calories, all else held constant.  
Figure 3.3 illustrates this effect by plotting the predicted caloric intake as a function of 
HC score for the three menu treatments, while holding all other variables constant at the overall 
means.  At low HC levels, the difference in the caloric intake between the control treatments and 
the other two treatments is greatest.  However, at higher HC levels, the lines converge.   
 Table 3.2 also reveals that entrée calories are negatively related to health consciousness, 
such that the more health conscious a person is, the fewer entrée calories the individual orders 
(significant at the 1% level). Under the control menu, every one unit increase in health 
consciousness results in a 52.48 entrée calorie decrease, on average. However, under the 
calorie+traffic light and calorie-only label treatments, the effects of health consciousness are not 
as pronounced (in effect, the labels cause less health conscious individuals to order more 
similarly to the more health conscious individual). The marginal effect of health consciousness in 
the calorie+traffic light treatment is -52.48 + 38.16 = -14.32, so the negative relationship 
66 
 
continues to hold but at a much lower absolute magnitude than in the control menu. In the 
calorie-only treatment, on the other hand, the marginal effect of health consciousness is -52.48 + 
55.79 = 3.31 – effectively zero.  These results suggest that the calorie-only label does not really 
tell the most health conscious individuals any new information; therefore, entrée calories are not 
further reduced under this labeling treatment. Figure 3.3 provides further evidence of this as the 
calorie-only line is relatively flat across all levels of health consciousness. The calorie+traffic 
light label, however, appears to provide a slightly different type of information – a normative 
rating system which suggests some menu items are better/worse than others. This new 
information could explain why entrée calories are further reduced in this menu condition among 
the more health conscious individuals. 
 In terms of demographics, we find that women order significantly fewer (p < 0.05) entrée 
calories compared to their male counterparts. This result aligns with the finding by Glanz et al. 
(1998) that nutrition is more important to women than men; thus, it is probable that women will 
select entrées which would be considered more nutritious (have fewer calories) than men. 
Student status, education, and party size proved to have no significant impact on entrée calories 
ordered. 
 Turning to the extra calories regression estimates, table 3.2 reveals that the effects of the 
calorie+traffic light and calorie-only labels disappear – neither coefficient is significantly 
different from zero. This result is not entirely surprising since many of the primary sources of 
extra calories (such as drinks and desserts) are not actually listed on the menu, meaning there is 
no label to inform diners of their caloric contents. Interestingly enough, none of the parameters 
significantly related to entrée calories are significant in the extra calories model. Education, 
however, does appear to at least marginally affect (p < 0.10) the number of extra calories 
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ordered, as people who have received a bachelor’s degree order 91.91 extra calories fewer, on 
average, than those diners who do not have a degree. Additionally, party size is negatively 
related (significant at the 1% level) to extra calories ordered such that the mean extra calories 
ordered will decline by 39.91 calories for each additional person seated at a table.  
 
Characteristics of Low-, Medium-, and High-Calorie Diners 
Table 3.3 offers insight into the characteristics of low-, medium- and high-calorie diners in terms 
of entrée calories ordered. Table 3.3 shows that the proportion of females was significantly 
different (p < 0.01) across the three groups of diners such that a higher proportion of females 
(0.750) ordered low-calorie entrées compared to the proportions who ordered medium- or high-
calorie entrées (0.565 and 0.333, respectively). Additionally, there were marginal differences (p 
< 0.10) across diners based on education variables. Current university students made up larger 
proportions of medium- and high-calorie diners whereas people who hold a bachelor’s degree 
made up a greater proportion of low-calorie diners. Age was another demographic factor which 
varied across categories as younger patrons (ages 18-34) were more likely to order medium- or 
high-calorie entrées; conversely, older patrons (ages 55 and older) were more likely to order low-
calorie entrées. Both the gender and age results support previous research which concludes 
nutrition is more important to women and older individuals (Glanz et al., 1998).   
 In addition to demographics, we also considered menu treatment variables for each class 
of diners. While neither the calorie+traffic light nor the calorie-only menus were statistically 
significant (p = 0.14 and p = 0.40, respectively), the results reveal that people who received the 
calorie+traffic light menu make up larger proportions of low- and medium-calorie diners. Forty-
seven percent of high-calorie diners, on the other hand, received the calorie-only menu, as 
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compared to only 25% percent of people who received calorie+traffic light menu. These results 
offer further evidence that the calorie+traffic light menu is more effective than the calorie-only 
menu in terms of reducing caloric intake. 
On the survey instrument, we asked diners to indicate which characteristic (price, 
anticipated taste, healthfulness, or recommendation from a server or friend) is most important 
when making a menu selection. Table 3.3 reports no statistical difference across categories for 
those who valued taste the most, but there was a significant difference (at the 1% level) for those 
who considered health to be the most important. Twenty-five percent of low-calorie diners 
considered health as the most important compared to only 4.8% and 2.8% of medium- and high-
calorie diners, respectively. Health consciousness revealed a similar result. Low-calorie diners 
had a mean health consciousness score of 11.2, while the mean health consciousness scores for 
medium- and high-calorie diners declined to 10.29 and 9.389, respectively (significantly 
different at the 5% level).  
 A final set of variables relate to the reasons for eating at the restaurant. Unquestionably, 
some occasions warrant different eating behaviors than others (i.e., a job interview lunch vs. 
lunch with friends). During our survey period, the top two reasons people gave for visiting the 
restaurant were to have lunch with friends or some type of business or work-related meal, so 
these are the two variables we include in table 3.3. From the table, we see that people who were 
eating lunch with friends make up larger proportions of medium- and high-calorie diners as 
opposed to low-calorie diners (significant at the 5% level). People visiting for business reasons 
were just the opposite as these patrons accounted for 30% of low-calorie diners but only 16.1% 
and 11.1% of medium- and high-calorie diners, respectively.   
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 Turning to table 3.4, we also categorized people as low-, medium-, or high-calorie diners 
based on the number of extra calories ordered.  The effect of gender disappears when focusing 
on extra calories ordered; however, there are still differences in terms of education variables. 
Again, current university students make up greater proportions of medium- and high-calorie 
diners (p < 0.10). Additionally, 47% of low-calorie diners hold a bachelor’s degree compared to 
13.3% and 28.6% of medium- and high-calorie diners (significant at the 1% level). In terms of 
age, a substantial proportion (0.90) of medium-calorie diners were 18-34 years old (p < 0.05).  
Although income was a non-factor in the entrée calorie analysis, table 3.4 reveals there 
are some differences across the three classes of diners based on income. Low income diners 
(those with < $25,000 in annual household income) make up the greatest proportions of medium- 
and high-calorie diners (0.60 and 0.452, respectively). Alternatively, higher income patrons 
(those with ≥ $100,000 in annual household income) were more likely to be low-calorie diners as 
opposed to medium- or high-calorie diners (significant at the 5% level). 
Variables related to health had a much smaller role in classifying extra calorie diners. 
Health consciousness was only marginally significant (p < 0.10). Similar to the entrée calorie 
results, low-calorie diners had the highest health consciousness scores, on average, yet the 
difference in health consciousness scores across the three diner groups was much smaller in the 
extra calories case. As mentioned previously, this result could be explained by the fact that 
caloric contents were not listed for the majority of extra calorie items, so diners could have been 
less aware of the “healthfulness” of these items. 
Finally, in terms of dining purpose, we again find that patrons visiting the restaurant for 
business or work-related purposes are more likely to be low-calorie diners as opposed to 
medium- or high-calorie diners (significant at the 5% level).  
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Conclusion 
The federal government passed a menu labeling law as part of the 2010 health care bill requiring 
chain restaurants to post caloric information for all menus. Increased attention to labeling laws 
has caused a surge in research related to the potential (and actual) effectiveness of calorie labels 
in restaurants. As these studies become more prevalent, one would expect the results to 
eventually converge and the research community to reach consensus on the impact of these 
labels; however, this has been far from the case. Some studies find calorie labels significantly 
reduce intake while others conclude the labels really have no effect.  
 These inconclusive results lead us to ask: are there factors beyond the label’s presence 
which influence a person’s level of caloric intake? Do women eat differently than men? Does a 
person’s level of health consciousness affect which items the individual chooses to order? Are 
food choices different depending on the reason (i.e., business lunch vs. lunch with friends) for 
which a person is eating in a restaurant? In this paper, we aim to provide insight on other 
variables (beyond the menu label itself) that could influence caloric intake in restaurants. 
Additionally, we seek to advance the literature by answering the “who eats what” question for 
restaurant patrons. Most studies have determined who is likely to eat in certain types of 
restaurants (namely fast-food establishments), but few have looked at what those people actually 
order once they are inside the restaurant. Just because an individual chooses to eat in a restaurant 
does not mean he/she must eat “unhealthy” (in this context, high-calorie) foods. On the contrary, 
restaurants today are introducing an increasing number of low-calorie options for those patrons 
who are concerned with maintaining good nutrition outside their own kitchen (York, 2011). 
Thus, this paper looks to identify which types of people are low-, medium-, and high-calorie 
diners in restaurants. 
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 To answer these questions, we collected survey data from 138 restaurant patrons in a full-
service restaurant. Survey questions related to the diner’s demographic characteristics, level of 
health consciousness, reason for and frequency of dining in the restaurant, and menu item 
selection(s). For each diner, we computed two measures of caloric intake: main entrée calories 
(calories from the main portion of the meal) and extra calories (calorie from additional side 
items, desserts, drinks, etc.). We then performed regressions on each of these measures of caloric 
intake as a function of (1) type of menu label, (2) health consciousness, and (3) demographic 
characteristics. Finally, we categorize people as low-, medium-, or high-calorie diners (based on 
both entrée and extra calories) and determine which types of people are likely to fall in each 
category. 
 Results of this study show that menu labels have a greater effect on entrée calories than 
on extra calories. Both the calorie+traffic light and calorie-only labels significantly reduced 
entrée calories ordered but neither affected extra calories ordered. The label could be less 
influential on extra calories because many of the extra calorie items (such as drinks and desserts) 
are not presented on the menu, so diners were not exposed to their caloric contents. Further, we 
found that the more health conscious a person was, the fewer entrée calories the individual 
ordered. It should be noted, however, that the interactions between each calorie label and health 
consciousness were significant and reveal that both labels are more effective among the least 
health conscious. These are precisely the people that menu labeling laws are often trying to 
influence. 
Moreover, our results suggest that the calorie+traffic light menu is more effective than 
the calorie-only menu at reducing entrée calories ordered as health consciousness increases. This 
may happen because the calorie+traffic light label provides new information that even the most 
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health conscious people may not know. Particularly, the traffic light symbol offers a normative 
suggestion to diners as to which items are better/worse for them to consume. 
 When we classify patrons as low-, medium-, or high-calorie diners based on the number 
of entrée calories ordered, we found that women made up the largest proportion of low-calorie 
diners, whereas men made up the greatest proportion of high-calorie diners. Other demographic 
groups that ordered higher proportions of low-calorie entrées included diners with a bachelor’s 
degree and diners who were 55 years or older. Congruent with the regression results, we found 
that diners who placed a high value on health when making menu selections and who were more 
health conscious tended to be low-calorie diners. Our results also revealed that calories ordered 
may depend on why a patron is visiting a restaurant in the first place. People who were at the 
restaurant for a business or work-related meal made up a larger proportion of low-calorie diners 
compared to medium- or high-calorie diners. 
 Together our results suggest that calorie labels in restaurants can be effective, but only 
among those restaurant patrons who have lower levels of health consciousness. For those who 
are highly health conscious, a calorie label provides little new information.  However, our 
findings would suggest that the addition of a symbol (in our study, a traffic light symbol) to the 
calorie information could further reduce calories ordered, even for individuals with high levels of 
health consciousness.  
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Figure 3.1 Survey Instrument  
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Figure 3.2 Average Number of Entrée, Extra, and Total Calories across Three Menu  
                  Treatments 
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Figure 3.3 Relationship between Health Consciousness and Entrée Calories Ordered in  
                  Three Menu Treatments 
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of Survey Respondents and Definition of Variables (N=138) 
Variable Definition Mean 
Female  1 if female; 0 if male 0.558 
Student  1 if current Oklahoma State University student; 
       0 otherwise; 
0.630 
Bachelor’s  1 if obtained bachelor’s degree; 0 otherwise 0.341 
Age1 1 if age is 18 to 34.99 years; 0 otherwise 0.696 
Age2  1 if age is 35 to 54.99 years; 0 otherwise 0.181 
Age3  1 if older than 55 years of age; 0 otherwise 0.123 
Income1  1 if annual household income is less than $25,000;  
       0 otherwise 
0.442 
Income2  1 if annual household income is between $25,000 and 
       $99,999; 0 otherwise 
0.399 
Income3  1 if annual household income is $100,000 or greater; 
       0 otherwise 
0.159 
Health 
Consciousness (HC) Level of health consciousness (can range from 3 to 15) 10.319 
Value Taste 1 if taste is most important characteristic in meal selection;  
       0 otherwise 
0.725 
Value Health 1 if healthfulness is most important characteristic in meal  
       selection; 0 otherwise 
0.101 
Party  Number of guests seated per table 2.928 
Calorie+traffic light 1 if diner received calorie+traffic light menu; 0 otherwise 0.391 
Calorie-only 1 if diner received calorie-only menu; 0 otherwise 0.391 
Control 1 if diner received control menu with no nutritional  
       information; 0 otherwise 
0.217 
Repeat Visitor 1 if diner is repeat visitor to the restaurant; 0 otherwise 0.616 
Lunch with Friends 1 if occasion for eating is lunch with friends; 0 otherwise 0.638 
Business Lunch 1 if occasion for eating is business or work-related;  
       0 otherwise 
0.188 
Entrée Calories Main entrée calories ordered per diner 606.341 
Extra Calories Extra calories beyond main entrée (i.e., additional side  
       items, desserts, drinks) ordered per diner 
152.174 
Total Calories Total calories ordered per diner 758.515 
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Table 3.2 Regression Estimates for Entrée Calories Ordered and Extra Calories  
                 Ordered 
      DV: Entrée Calories 
 
DV: Extra Calories 
Variable            Estimate 
 
          Estimate 
Intercept  1185.75***   456.19*** 
            (189.04)
a
            (144.99) 
Calorie+traffic light -496.34**             101.34 
            (210.66)            (145.80) 
Calore-only   -610.69***              -77.02 
            (193.01)            (140.47) 
Health Consciousness (HC)              -52.48***              -15.57 
              (14.93)                (9.71) 
Female  -99.01**                 5.12 
              (40.25)              (32.23) 
Student  4.82              -49.99 
              (65.90)              (50.92) 
Bachelor’s              -19.59              -91.91* 
              (75.00)              (49.90) 
Party               25.06   -39.91*** 
              (17.55)              (10.12) 
Calorie+traffic light*HC   38.16**                -7.67 
              (18.06)              (11.99) 
Calorie-only*HC     55.79***               13.67 
              (17.19)              (12.22) 
    
R-Squared 0.24                 0.18 
Number of Observations 138                 138 
 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
a
Standard errors are in parentheses (heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors)  
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Table 3.3 Demographic Characteristics of Low-, Medium-, and High-Calories Diners (Based  
                 on Entrée Calories) 
Variable 
Low Calorie Diners 
(≤ 400 Entrée Calories) 
Medium Calorie Diners 
(401-800 Entrée Calories) 
High-Calorie Diners 
(> 800 Entrée Calories) 
Female***  0.750 0.565 0.333 
Student*  0.500 0.710 0.639 
Bachelor’s*  0.475 0.274 0.306 
Age1** 0.525 0.790 0.722 
Age2  0.225 0.161 0.167 
Age3***  0.250 0.048 0.111 
Income1  0.375 0.516 0.389 
Income2  0.400 0.387 0.417 
Income3  0.225 0.097 0.194 
Calorie+traffic light 0.475 0.419 0.250 
Calorie-only 0.325 0.387 0.472 
Value Taste 0.625 0.742 0.806 
Value Health*** 0.250 0.048 0.028 
Health 
Consciousness** 
11.200 10.290 9.389 
Repeat Visitor 0.700 0.581 0.583 
Lunch with Friends** 0.500 0.742 0.611 
Business Lunch* 0.300 0.161 0.111 
    
Number of 
Observations 
40 62 36 
 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 3.4 Demographic Characteristics of Low-, Medium-, and High-Calories Diners (Based  
                 on Extra Calories) 
Variable 
Low Calorie Diners 
(0 Extra Calories) 
Medium Calorie Diners 
(1-250 Extra Calories) 
High-Calorie Diners 
(> 250 Extra Calories) 
Female  0.561 0.567 0.548 
Student*  0.545 0.800 0.643 
Bachelor’s***  0.470 0.133 0.286 
Age1** 0.606 0.900 0.690 
Age2*  0.227 0.033 0.214 
Age3  0.167 0.067 0.095 
Income1*  0.364 0.600 0.452 
Income2  0.394 0.367 0.429 
Income3**  0.242 0.033 0.119 
Calorie+traffic light 0.379 0.333 0.452 
Calorie-only* 0.348 0.467 0.405 
Value Taste 0.682 0.767 0.762 
Value Health 0.106 0.033 0.143 
Health 
Consciousness* 
10.939 9.700 9.786 
Repeat Visitor 0.636 0.467 0.690 
Lunch with Friends 0.561 0.667 0.738 
Business Lunch** 0.273 0.067 0.143 
    
Number of 
Observations 
66 30 42 
 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
With obesity and other diet-related diseases on the rise, U.S. policymakers are focused on 
designing legislation to help Americans help themselves at making “healthier” (generally 
interpreted as lower-calorie) food choices. Since an increasing proportion of food dollars are 
spent away from home, restaurants are the target of current legislative efforts. Currently the FDA 
has proposed a menu labeling law which will require chain restaurants to provide calorie 
information for all menu items on all menus and menu boards (FDA, 2011). The purpose of this 
research is to provide some insight on how consumers and restaurants may be affected by 
mandatory calorie labeling legislation. 
 Using two field experiments in full service restaurants, I am able to glean some key 
insights about calorie labels. First, my results show that labeling policies are likely to outperform 
pricing policies (such as “fat taxes/thin subsidies”) in terms of reducing caloric intake. Secondly, 
the results reveal that the type of calorie label implemented (numeric vs. symbolic calorie label) 
does matter. The menu labeling legislation, as currently proposed by the FDA, would mandate a 
numeric calorie label where the number of calories is listed by each menu item. Both restaurants 
in this research, however, showed that this type of calorie label will have a modest (if any) effect 
on caloric intake. Results from these studies would suggest that the effectiveness of the numeric 
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calorie label could be enhanced by adding some type of symbol (in this case, a traffic light 
symbol) which also conveys nutrition information. 
Third, calorie labels provide the greatest benefit to those restaurant patrons with lower 
levels of health consciousness. People who are already knowledgeable about food and nutrition 
are less likely to be influenced by calorie labels. It is important to note, however, that the 
symbolic calorie label can still reduce caloric intake even among the most health conscious, 
which suggests that the traffic light symbol may offer new information to a larger subset of the 
diner population.  
Fourth, this research reveals that restaurants are unlikely to be affected by the addition of 
calorie labels on their menus. Entrée dollars could decline, but it appears that dollars spent over 
the entire meal will remain stable. 
 While these results show that a symbolic calorie label is likely to lead to the largest 
reductions in caloric intake, this type of label could still be problematic from a policy standpoint. 
One question this research did not address is why traffic light symbols might be more effective 
than simple numeric statements at reducing caloric intake. It could be that the symbols are more 
easily and quickly interpreted by diners. That is, the cost of information acquisition might be 
lower for symbolic labels. A different interpretation, however, is that the labels go beyond 
information provision and send a normative statement about what the consumer should order. A 
red traffic-light, after all, is synonymous with “STOP.” While many people are relatively 
comfortable with the federal government taking on the role of providing unbiased information to 
facilitate market transactions, at least some subset of the population is likely to be less 
enthusiastic about policies that are viewed as paternalistic. Moreover, determination of cutoffs 
for traffic light labels are likely to be open to political manipulation by interested parties who do 
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not want to find themselves on the wrong side of yellow. We leave to future research some of 
these challenges associated with traffic light labeling.    
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